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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the volatile relationship between the political prisoners and the
common criminals in the Soviet GULAG. Lenin’s theories on crime and punishment shaped the
early Soviet penal system; he implemented policies which favored the common criminals and
repressed the political prisoners. He deemed that the criminals, as “social allies” of the working
class, were more likely to become good Soviet citizens than the political prisoners, considered
“counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of the state.” In the decade after the Bolshevik revolution,
the prison administration empowered the criminals in the GULAG by giving them access to the
life-saving jobs and goods in the labor camps, while gradually withdrawing the political
prisoners’ access to the same. From the 1930s to shortly after the end of World War II, the
strong criminal fraternity in the GULAG robbed, beat, and killed the political prisoners, while
the GULAG administration refused to intervene. Using the testimony of former political
prisoners and GULAG personnel, as well as secondary sources, I identify the policies that led to
the criminals’ “reign of terror,” I address theories regarding if and why the administration
permitted such violence and disorder in the camps, and I demonstrate that the political prisoners
responded to their situation in a range of ways, from holding their tormentors in contempt to
forming a tentative friendships with individual criminals who could offer them their protection
and a way to survive the camps.
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INTRODUCTION
“I had more than a fair share of patience, enough to withstand work beyond my
physical powers, starvation, and slavery. But never should I be able to put up with
living among common criminals…. What was uppermost was a feeling of anguish
– not for them, but for myself – that by some devilish conjuration I was
condemned to a form of torture more fearful than starvation or disease, to the
torture of life among subhuman creatures.”
-Eugenia Ginzburg1
This excerpt in Eugenia Ginzburg’s memoir highlights one of the most challenging
aspects of life in the Soviet prison camps for those unfortunate enough to receive a sentence for a
“political” crime. Ginzburg, as one of these political prisoners, spent over eighteen years in labor
camps and in exile, during which time her first husband and her firstborn died, where she
endured “starvation and slavery,” yet the experience of “life among subhuman creatures” ranked
as one of her greatest challenges. Ginzburg was not alone in this sentiment; references to the
torment of living with the common criminals litter the memoirs of former prisoners of the
GULAG.
The acronym GULAG stands for Glavnoe Upravlenei Lagerei (Main Camp
Administration). It refers to the administrative body that controlled the Soviet penal system from
1934 to 1956, but it is has become synonymous with the penal system itself, which spanned the
entire Soviet regime, and which included labor camps, special punishment camps, prisons, and
forced-exile colonies. The GULAG was an integral part of the Soviet system. It originated with
the imprisonment of political prisoners following the Bolshevik revolution, it expanded to
receive the victims of Stalin’s paranoia in the 1930s, and it collapsed after the death of its most
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loyal supporter in 1953, although it never truly disappeared until the end of the Soviet Union.
About twenty million prisoners passed through the GULAG at its height, between 1929 and
1953,2 but they experienced the GULAG differently according to their social and political class.
The administration distinguished between the “socially friendly” criminals and the “socially
hostile” political prisoners, and treated them accordingly. They granted power and privileges to
the criminals, who harassed, robbed, beat, and killed the political prisoners with impunity.
To my knowledge, there are no scholars that focus particularly on this aspect of the
GULAG. In a sense, the GULAG is still a very young field. The Soviet government heavily
restricted access to information about the GULAG while it was in power. In the late 1980s, it
permitted the publication of many GULAG memoirs, and opened a number of their archives to
historians, but research into the GULAG truly blossomed after the fall of the Soviet regime in
1991, when historians gained access to much of the previously classified information. As Soviet
historian Robert Conquest put it: “If a historian’s problem in Soviet history used to be a shortage
of material, the current challenge is the opposite: the enormous number of documents
available.”3 The difficult process of deciding what to use and how to use it shaped much of the
historiography of the GULAG.
The first significant studies of the GULAG were comprehensive, detailed volumes about
the GULAG’s creation, evolution, prisoners and practices. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn clandestinely
published the first history of the GULAG, The Gulag Archipelago, in 1973; his ground-breaking
work bypassed the closed archives by using “reports, memoirs, and letters by 227 witnesses” as
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well as his own experiences to explore and explain the GULAG.4 In 2003 Anne Applebaum
published Gulag: A History, which resembles Solzhenitsyn’s in subject and scope, but greatly
added to the field by its use of the newly-opened archives to verify information gathered from
“several hundred camp memoirs.”5
Researchers then turned away from the big picture to focus on specific elements of the
GULAG. Oleg V. Khlevniuk’s The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great
Terror is a document-based study of the GULAG during one of its most significant phases – its
expansion and evolution under Stalin. By restricting himself to a smaller timeframe, Khlevniuk
was able to examine and collect the relevant material very thoroughly. Steven A. Barnes kept a
wide time frame but narrowed the location in Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the
Shaping of Soviet Society, in which he used official documents and biographies to construct a
complete history of a camp in Karaganda, “one of the few locales to experience most of the
major institutions and events of the GULAG’s history.”6
These works include information about the criminals in a variety of ways: in chapters
dedicated to the subject (Solzhenitsyn and Applebaum), as part of the historical narrative
(Barnes), or mentioned in passing (Khlevniuk). Solzhenitsyn wrote the most on the subject, but,
because his work is a cross between a monograph and a memoir, I discuss his views in full when
I examine the testimony of other political prisoners in chapter two of this paper. These historians
established the general character of the criminals, described the hostility between the criminals
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and the political prisoners, and identified the early Soviet theories and policies that fostered the
criminals’ eventual rise to power in the GULAG. I want to go beyond generalizations and find
out if there are subtler patterns of behavior between the criminals, the administrators, and the
political prisoners.
The GULAG administration divided its prisoners into two general categories: those who
committed “political” crimes and those who committed “non-political” crimes. They considered
the “non-political” criminals as ordinary criminals. There were two types of “ordinary criminals”
in the GULAG: the petty offenders, usually peasants or workers who received sentences for
minor theft, like stealing a pencil from the workplace, and the professional criminals, for whom
crime was a means of survival or a way of life, and who either belonged to, or aspired to belong
to, the wide-spread criminal fraternity, the vory-v-zakone.
In this paper, the term “criminal” refers to the latter type of criminal, whom the
memoirists also called “professional criminals,” blatnye, and urki. Their identity as criminals
depended more on their life before the GULAG and their membership in the criminal fraternity
than on the type of sentence they received from the Soviet courts. For example, a criminal could
receive a sentence for a “political” crime, such as stealing something from a state warehouse,
which would condemn him to the status of a political prisoner in the eyes of the GULAG
administration, but his or her fellow prisoners would still consider this individual a criminal, not
a political prisoner.7
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“Political prisoners” refer to all those in the GULAG who did not engage in traditionally
criminal activity prior to their arrest and whom the authorities sentenced for “political crimes.”
In the earliest years of the labor camps, the political prisoners were dissidents or active members
of other political parties whom the Soviet regime imprisoned for their political views. After the
mass expansion of the GULAG in the 1930s, this type of political prisoner almost disappeared
and the new political prisoners, especially those sentenced during the Great Terror, were only
political in name: they did not know why they were in the GULAG, for few had intentionally or
openly opposed the regime. This thesis will touch on the former type of political prisoner, but it
will direct the majority of its attention to the latter.
The criminals and the political prisoners had a complicated relationship throughout the
history of the GULAG. From 1918 to 1934, the criminals’ power gradually increased, and so did
their violence toward the political prisoners. This unchecked aggression peaked from 1934 to
1945. Beginning in the 1950s, the political prisoners, with the unintentional help of the
administration, successfully subdued the criminals, reorienting the balance of power in their
favor. In this paper, I focus on the years 1918 to 1950, from the creation of the first labor camps
to the year that the criminals began to lose their status as leaders of the camps. I address how the
criminals rose to such power and if and why the administration permitted it. Then, I examine
how the political prisoners perceived the criminals who controlled the camps.
Lacking knowledge of the Russian language, I use translated GULAG memoirs and other
first-person accounts as my primary sources. These include memoirs written by former political
prisoners and members of the administration, who experienced life in the GULAG between 1918
and 1950. I do not have access to any verifiable memoirs left by criminals; many of them joined
5

the criminal gangs at a young age, as discussed in chapter three, and they never escaped the
criminal life, despite their “reeducation” in the labor camps.8 Thus, there is a paucity of
information about the criminals from the individuals themselves. Much of what historians know
about the criminals is from the observation of outsiders who came into frequent contact with
them in the GULAG. Likewise, this paper reflects how these outsiders – memoirists of various
nationalities, but mostly well-educated and moderately prosperous – perceived and experienced
life with the “alien” criminal class.
The first chapter of this paper uses secondary sources to outline the history of the
GULAG from 1918 to 1956; it does not cover the history of the entire system in all its
complexity, only those events and elements that are relevant to the subject of this paper. It
demonstrates how the Bolshevik theories on crime and punishment shaped the early prison
camps, and how the dynamic between the administration, criminals, and political prisoners
changed over time in response to events inside and outside the camp walls. As the scattered
network of labor camps transformed into a huge, centralized detention system, the camp
administration intensified the way that it interpreted and enforced Lenin’s theories, which had
direct consequences for the criminals and political prisoners.
The second chapter addresses factors that contributed to the criminals’ status in the
GULAG. The first part of the chapter looks at how the criminals in the GULAG banded together
into a strong fraternity, the vory-v-zakone, whose code of conduct united this otherwise

8
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criminal because he reportedly spent many years as a train thief and belonged to various criminal gangs before
entering the GULAG. However, historians regard him as an unreliable narrator, so I only cite his memoir regarding
information that has been backed up by other sources.
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disjointed group into a powerful, close-knit society. This unity was the criminals’ greatest
strength, and gave them a significant advantage when they interacted with the political prisoners.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the GULAG administration; why they perceived the
criminals as “socially friendly elements” and how this influenced their policies which
empowered the criminals at the expense of the political prisoners. It also identifies two main
theories concerning why the administration permitted the criminals to wield such power over
their peers and cause such chaos in the camps: first, that the administration fully intended to use
the criminals as an extra level of control over the “dangerous” political prisoners, either out of
perceived necessity or convenience, or second, that the administration fostered the empowerment
of the criminals because of the theory that were “socially friendly,” but the criminals gained too
much power, and during the height of their dominance in the camps, the administration permitted
their violent activities because they could not control them.
The final chapter covers how the political prisoners experienced life with the criminals. I
address the women’s experiences separately, because they were especially vulnerable to abuse
by both male and female criminals. By examining the way that the political prisoners wrote
about the criminals, the incidents they related, and the emotions that they demonstrated in their
memoirs, I identify a range of attitudes toward the criminals. Many loathed them, but for
different reasons – fear, jealousy, betrayal, and moral indignation. A couple of political prisoners
managed to forge more positive relationships with the criminals, giving them a unique insight
into the lives of a few individual criminals, and more sympathetic perception of the criminals in
general. This paper ultimately shows that, while there is a dominant narrative regarding the

7

criminals, their alliance with the GULAG administration, and their behavior with the political
prisoners, there are also exceptions and nuances to this narrative that deserve attention.

8

CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF THE GULAG (1918-1956)
As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote, the GULAG “was born with the shots of the cruiser
Aurora” – that is, at the very beginning of the Bolshevik revolution.9 In the following forty
years, the GULAG became an integral part of the Soviet Union’s political and economic system.
This chapter gives an overview of the history of the GULAG, from the establishment of the first
forced labor camps in 1918 to the dismantling of the system in 1956. Based on the work of
GULAG historians, this chapter does not provide a comprehensive history of the GULAG;
rather, it focuses on the key theories and events that influenced the subject of this paper. It
examines how Bolshevik theories on crime and punishment – that is, the existence of class
enemies and the re-educative nature of forced labor – drove the first prisoners into the Soviet
penal system, while the regime’s fluctuating priorities between re-education and economic
efficiency shaped the early camps into the extensive system that blossomed under Stalin. It also
highlights how the GULAG’s evolution reflected the momentous events that affected the free
population, such as the Stalin’s “Revolution from Above,” the Great Terror, World War II,
Stalin’s death, and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech. This chapter provides a framework for the
discussion in the following two chapters about the relationship between the GULAG
administration, the common criminals, and the political prisoners.

9
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Lenin’s Theories on Crime and Reformation
When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 191710, they embarked on a mission “to
transform society, to engineer a new socialist soul.”11 Part of this transformation was the
eradication of crime, to which Lenin referred as “social excess;” he argued that the underlying
cause of crime was “the exploitation of the masses,” but that once they removed the cause, it
“will lead to the withering away of the excess.”12 Capitalism caused crime, and thus the most
harmful members of Soviet society were the capitalists, also called “class enemies” or
“counterrevolutionaries,” who sought to undermine the Bolshevik regime. Lenin emphasized that
“imprisonment [be] seen not as social retribution exacted on the criminal, but as a means of
reforming the prisoner.” 13 He saw manual labor, in service of the State, as the key to reform.14
Lenin had considered the idea of forced labor for the “former people” even before the
Bolsheviks came to power, when he sketched out plans for “‘obligatory work duty’ for wealthy
capitalists.”15 After becoming head of the government, he elaborated on the idea, saying that
“universal labor service” is the “most powerful means … for ‘setting in motion’ the state
apparatus, for overcoming the resistance of the capitalists, for subjecting them to the proletarian
state.” In the same essay, he insisted that “We must make people work within the framework of
the new state organization. It is not enough to “get rid of” the capitalists, it is necessary (after
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having removed the incapable ones, the incorrigible “resister”) to put them to new state
service."16
The Bolsheviks “viewed themselves as engineers reforming raw human material.”17 In
this respect, not all prisoners were equal. According to class theory, the common criminals were
the “proletariat” of the prison system, true Soviets whose crimes “arose only in response to the
devaluation of labor under repressive capitalist control.”18 The Soviet government referred to this
class as the “socially friendly” or “social allies.” They believed that the social allies would
benefit from their re-educative efforts far more than the “class enemies.”19 During the creation
and expansion of the penal system, however, the Soviet government publicly maintained that the
re-education and reformation of the prisoner, no matter their background, was possible, and this
re-educative mission was the reason that their prisons were superior to those of the West.20
The Early Soviet Penal System (1918-1929)
After the 1917 February Revolution, the Provisional Government inherited the extensive
Tsarist penal system. Almost immediately, it released more than half of the Tsar’s prisoners,
while, in the provinces, waves of mobs released prisoners in local facilities on a massive scale.
The penal system changed hands again after the 1917 October Revolution, when the People’s
Commissariat of Justice disbanded the Provisional Government’s prison agencies and replaced

Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, Collected works of V.I. Lenin, trans. Moissaye J. Olgin, vol. 21, ed. Alexander
Trachtenberg (New York: International Publishers, 1932), Book 2, 32.
17
Barnes, 14.
18
Ibid, 87.
19
Solzhenitsyn, 2: 434.
20
See Fyodor Mucholsky, Gulag Boss, trans. Deborah Kaple (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),
11.
16
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them with their own, at which point the Soviet regime quickly began to purge the “class
enemies.” 21 In 1917, Lenin passed an edict for the “merciless suppression of attempts at anarchy
on the part of drunkards, hooligans, counterrevolutionaries, and other persons.”22 In January of
1918, he followed it up with an exhortation for the country to unite in “purging the Russian land
of all kinds of harmful insects.”23 In response, local revolutionary tribunals, made up of “random
supporters of the Revolution” convicted “class enemies” of the regime – bankers, merchants and
other “speculators,” and former Tsarist officials.24
The Bolsheviks also began arresting their political opponents; at first, the police organs
sought out members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which had connections with the
former Provisional Government. Then, in 1918, they arrested members of the left-leaning parties
– the Left and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the Anarchists.25 The
Bolshevik regime filled up its prisons as quickly as the Provisional Government had emptied
them, but they were poorly staffed, disorganized, and overcrowded.26 For example, in 1917, the
Petrograd prison was under such disorder that, according to one former Soviet official, “the only
people who didn’t escape were those who were too lazy.”27 In 1918, the Soviet government
decided to entrust its most dangerous prisoners – the class enemies and political opponents – to a

21

Galina M. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism trans. Carol Flath, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Armonk, N.Y: M.E.
Sharpe, 2000), 7-11.
22
Lenin, Sobrannye Sochineniya (Collected Works), fifth edition, 35:68, quoted in Solzhenitsyn, 1:27.
23
Lenin, Sobrannye Sochineniya, 35:204, quoted in Solzhenitsyn, Gulag, 1:27.
24
Applebaum, Gulag, 5-6.
25
Solzhenitsyn, 1:26-30.
26
Jakobson, 3.
27
Applebaum, Gulag, 7-8.

12

parallel penal system run by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting
Counterrevolution and Sabotage, or Cheka.28
The first recorded instructions about forced labor for prisoners came from the Central
Penal Department of the People’s Commissariat in July 1918, when they passed the “Temporary
Instructions on Deprivation of Freedom.” This stated that “those deprived of freedom who are
capable of labor must be recruited for physical work on a compulsory basis.” 29 On April 15,
1919, the Central Executive Committee passed a decree that established forced labor camps
designed to hold “class enemies” sentenced by Cheka, the Revolutionary Tribunals, or the
People’s Courts. A second, more detailed decree on May 17, 1919, defined that the camps were
supposed to be self-sufficient, with the administrators’ wages and camp maintenance paid by a
portion of the prisoners’ wages. It also stated that there should be a forced labor camp, capable of
holding at least three hundred people, established at the outskirts of every provincial capital. 30 By
the end of 1919, there were twenty-one camps in Russia: within a year, there were five times that
many.31
The People’s Commissariat of Justice controlled prisons, agricultural colonies, and
juvenile institutions, which held the non-serious offenders - the common criminals. Meanwhile,
Cheka controlled the special prisons and camps. In 1922, the regime decided to transfer the
Commissariat of Justice’s prisons, camps and colonies to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or

28
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the NKVD.32 Cheka, renamed GPU (State Political Administration), was a subsidiary of the
NKVD, but it retained full control of its special facilities. In 1923, the Council of People’s
Commissars, or Sovnarkom, placed the GPU under its own jurisdiction, making it and its camps
systems “not subject to general legislation” and keeping its operations secret from the public.33
The NKVD operated alongside GPU camps until 1929, running the “general places of
incarceration” such as “prisons, corrective labor colonies, and transit points.”34
The Early Political Prisoners
The Cheka/GPU’s special prisons and camps held two categories of prisoners in the
beginning. The first was “counterrevolutionaries,” which included White Guards, priests, former
Czarist officials, and members of the “bourgeois” political parties, such as the Constitutional
Democrats, and anyone else considered especially dangerous to the regime. The second was
political opponents, mostly members of the leftist parties, including the Mensheviks, the Left and
Right Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Anarchists.35 These were the political prisoners, until the
1930s, when the regime redefined this term.
The political prisoners were especially challenging to the prison administrators, because,
as determined members of leftist political parties, many of them had spent time in the Tsarist
prison system for attacking the Tsarist government and promoting their “dangerous” political
ideas about the future of the Russian state. Under the Tsar, political prisoners received special
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treatment: they had special rations, they could walk unrestricted in the prison yard during the
day, and they could have reading and writing material at all times. They received courtesy and
respect from the Tsarist jailers, and they expected the same treatment from the Soviet regime.
Moreover, the political prisoners’ experience in Tsarist prisons taught them how to make such
demands. They knew how to communicate by knocking messages on the cell walls. They knew
the effectiveness of hunger strikes and of electing a spokesperson from each cell to make
demands and carry out negotiations.36
The political prisoners used all the tools at their disposal to keep their “political regime,”
while the prison administration worked just as hard to take it away. One such prisoner, Bertha
Babina-Nevskaya, recalled that she and her fellow political prisoners “raised objections over the
slightest pretext. We demanded extra trips to the bathhouse, more exercise time, visits - things
we knew were out of the question.”37 The political prisoners’ demands and negotiation tactics
were annoying to the prison directors, but the real danger was their ability to get in contact with
the outside world. Most of the non-Bolshevik parties had émigré branches who could cause
international uproar on behalf of their imprisoned members. The Soviet regime was concerned
about the bad publicity in the West because many of the early Bolsheviks had lived in exile, and
“were sensitive to the opinions of their old international comrades.” They were also worried that
the bad press reports would hinder the anticipated proletariat revolution in Europe. In the spring
of 1923, the Cheka, now renamed OGPU (Joint State Political Administration), found a solution:

36
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they moved the political prisoners to an island in the far north called Solovetsky, which, when
the sea froze during the arctic winter months, was totally inaccessible to the outside world.38
Solovetsky: “The First Camp of the GULAG”
Solovetsky was part of a chain of islands in the White Sea, and home to a community of
monks. The Soviet government confiscated the monastery complex and gave it to the OGPU as
the site for a permanent labor camp. In 1923, the OGPU began transferring prisoners to
Solovetsky – both “counterrevolutionaries” and political prisoners.39 The political prisoners
received full political treatment until December, when the sea froze and cut off the island from
the rest of the world. Then, the Solovetsky chief began to take away their political “privileges” in
waves. They tried protests and hunger strikes, but, they were no longer able to wield the threat of
publicity, and so, ultimately, the camp administrators won. By 1925, the former political
prisoners lived in the same conditions as all the other prisoners.40
The camp system on Solovetsky expanded rapidly. It began in 1923 with a few hundred
prisoners in a number of monasteries, but by 1925, there were around six thousand of them, in
nine separate camps, each of which the administration further divided into labor battalions.41
Most of these prisoners were “counterrevolutionaries,” until 1926, when the OGPU began
receiving large numbers of common criminals to the camp.42 By 1925, the prisoners worked in a
variety of occupations: forestry, farming, fishing, and brick-making.43
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During its expansion, Solovetsky and its nearby camps, known as the “camps of special
significance,” or SLON, were supposed to be self-sufficient corrective labor camps, but their
policies and practices did not indicate that they prioritized economic efficiency or prisoner reeducation. The SLON camp bosses and guards had almost unlimited power over the prisoners
and very little direct supervision by the OGPU. The unofficial motto was, “here there is no
Soviet authority, only Solovetsky authority.” They tortured prisoners at whim, put them to heavy
labor for days at a time with no respite, or ordered them to do meaningless tasks, such as moving
“huge quantities of snow from one place to another,” or jumping “off bridges into rivers
whenever a guard shouted ‘Dolphin!’” There were also mass executions, seemly at random.
Anne Applebaum estimated that “from a quarter to one half of the prisoners may have died of
typhus, starvation, and other epidemics every year.”44 It is little wonder that by 1925 the SLON
camps proved to be unprofitable, and the Soviet government recognized “the need to make better
use of prisoners.”45
Solovetsky’s solution came from an unlikely source: a former Solovetsky prisoner named
Naftaly Aronovich Frenkel. A merchant from Haifa, Palestine, Frenkel was arrested in 1923 for
illegally crossing the borders, sentenced to ten years in Solovetsky. By 1924, the SLON
administration petitioned for his release, describing him as “an exceptionally talented…rare and
responsible worker.” In 1925, he organized and ran the Economic-Commercial department of
SLON. There, he took advantage of the camp’s large, unpaid workforce, and outbid civilian
forestry companies to cut wood and build roads near the camps. Frenkel’s goal was to make the
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camp more efficient. He terminated everything in the camps that did not “contribute to the
camp’s economic productivity.” He ended the lighter Solovetsky industries, such as farming, or
selling furs. He removed various “re-educational” facilities, including the camp’s newspaper, and
he limited the prisoners’ participation in the camp theater and museum. He even minimized the
random beatings and torments imposed on the prisoners, because administration now prioritized
the prisoners’ “work capability.”46
The most notorious reform during this time was the new food distribution system.
Historians disagree as to whether or not Frenkel himself invented it, but he definitely
implemented it in order to promote prisoner productivity. The authorities divided all the
prisoners of SLON into three categories: heavy workers, light workers, and invalids. They gave
each group tasks that seemed appropriate to their abilities, and then set norms for each task. The
prisoners who fulfilled their norms received a full meal, but those who only filled a fraction of
the norms received a corresponding fraction of the meal. This system sent the weakest prisoners
quickly to their deaths, because they entered a vicious circle: malnutrition weakened the
prisoners, so they filled less of the norms, and received even less food, until they perished. In the
1930’s, this system became a standard in all the camps.47 The SLON never actually became selfsufficient, even after Frenkel’s directions, but compared to the other prisons and camps, it was
enormously successful, which made it an attractive model for the rest of the prison system.48
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The New Political Prisoners
By 1925, the SLON administration no longer recognized members of former political
parties as political prisoners, worthy of special privileges.49 In 1926, the Soviet government
published a new criminal code, the most significant portion of which was Article 58, which
addressed “crimes against the State.” As Solzhenitsyn put it: “In all truth, there is no step,
thought, action, or lack of action under the heavens which could not be punished by the heavy
hand of Article 58.”50 Between 1925 and 1929, the division of prisoners changed; they went
from A) political prisoners and B) “counterrevolutionaries,” to A) common criminals and B)
everybody else. By the 1930s, the administration referred to both the former
“counterrevolutionaries” and the new prisoners sentenced under Article 58 of the Criminal Code
as political prisoners.51 During the early period of the prison camps, from the 1920s to the early
1930s, there was not a significant difference in the treatment of political prisoners and criminals.
Much of the prisoners’ treatment still depended on the camp chiefs, who did not have much
guidance from the higher camp administration. This would soon change.
The Camp System Expands (1930-1940)
In 1929, Stalin became the undisputed head of the government and implemented his
“Revolution from Above.” He established a new Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization, and
accelerated the pace of forced collectivization in the countryside. Both policies generated a flood
of prisoners – peasants who resisted collectivization, and “wreckers” whom the government
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blamed for industry failures. These arrests placed terrible strain on the regular penal system run
by the NKVD, prompting Politburo to set up a commission to solve this problem. They
suggested integrating the ordinary and special camp systems, following the SLON model, and
putting it under the control of the OGPU.52 In 1934, the government reorganized the OGPU into
the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and gave the NKVD control of all the
OGPU labor camps and colonies, as well as the few that were still under the control of the
People’s Commissariat of Justice.53 The NKVD created a separate department to run the camps,
the Main Camp Administration - Glavnoe Upravlenei Lagerei, or GULAG.54
Meanwhile, prisoners poured into these OGPU camps so quickly that the administration
struggled to find occupations for their new arrivals. In 1930, Politburo handed them a solution:
the creation of a canal between the White and the Baltic Sea. In 1931-1933, the OGPU
established new labor camps, organized in the Solovetsky manner, and poured its manpower into
building the canal. Elsewhere, it continued its lumbering operations on a large scale, and began
gold mining, which became an equally important operation for the GULAG. The OGPU also
established camps, on a smaller scale, which focused on coal mining, oil drilling, agriculture,
construction, and creating consumer goods. There was also a branch of the GULAG that
employed convict engineers in design laboratories.55
During this period of rapid expansion, the prisoners lived in poor conditions. The
administration was ill-equipped to handle the large numbers of incoming prisoners, and often put
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them in unfinished camps, a circumstance that continued into the 1940’s. The prisoners were
underfed, overworked, and prone to typhus, tuberculosis, and scurvy.56 In 1932, a severe famine
struck, a partial result of Stalin’s forced collectivization, which drastically drove up the death
rates of the camp inmates, which the administration tried to counter by releasing all disabled,
chronically ill, and dying prisoners.57
After the influx of prisoners and rapid expansion of the early 1930s, the camp system
became a little more stable and more organized. The administration established better oversight
on the individual camps, but as a result, the camp regime became more uniform and more
difficult, especially for the political prisoners, who began to lose the small “privileges” they once
possessed. As Solzhenitsyn described it,
…The camp regime was made stricter and tightened up. And the many cracks that were
discovered via which freedom could still observe the archipelago. All those ties were now
broken off, and the cracks filled in…an iron curtain descended around the archipelago.58
For example, the administration strengthened the camp perimeter and guard systems, further
reduced the camps’ re-educational activities, restricted the number of visitors permitted to the
camps, and stopped offering to reduce the prisoner’s sentence in return for over-fulfilling their
work norms.59
The Great Terror
These changes in the camp regime coincided with a series of purges that pushed more
and more prisoners into the camps and colonies. In 1935, the police organs, under Stalin’s
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orders, eliminated the “former people” – all those connected, in any way, to the old regime. They
also carried out a campaign to reduce the crime rate by arresting “criminals and lumpen
elements” and those who did not have internal passports. The regime also began to purge border
zones, primarily in Western Ukraine, the Leningrad province, and Karelia. It also undertook a
small-scale purge of the party in 1935, with 15,218 “enemies” arrested.60
Stalin’s purges intensified in 1936 and reached their peak in 1937-1938, years which later
became known as “the Great Terror.” It began with the trials, and executions, of Stalin’s political
rivals for “counterrevolutionary” activities, and the persecution of their families, friends, and
associates. They purged the army and defense industry, and then “former kulaks, criminals, and
anti-Soviet elements.”61 These “anti-Soviet elements” were, in large part, members of the
communist party. The Politburo gave every province, territory and republic a quota for arrests
and executions.62 The purges pushed an ever-increasing number of men, women, and children
into the camps. In 1934, there were an average of 620,000 prisoners in the labor camps; by 1939,
there were 1,340,000.63
To cope with the rising number of inmates, the Politburo ordered the GULAG to create
new camps; these were very hastily constructed and underfunded, and during the punishing
winter months they were lethal. In addition, the Politburo ordered the administration to shoot
more than 10,000 “active counterrevolutionaries” in the camps.64 The mortality rates reached a
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high only surpassed by those during the famine of 1933. The administration created the camps to
hold 57,000-60,000 prisoners, but by 1938 the number of prisoners exceeded this limit by
150,000, and this number would have been higher if not for the high death rate in the camps.
Moreover, the general chaos of the camps, the lack of supplies, largely due to mismanagement
and theft, and the poor health of the new arrivals, prevented the camps from even fulfilling the
new projects that the Politburo had assigned them.65
Beria’s Reforms
In November of 1938, the Politburo issued orders to stop the Great Terror, with a final
purge of the NKVD, for whom they blamed the “excesses” carried out in the two previous years.
Stalin removed Nikolai Yezhov, his devoted subordinate and main organizer of the Terror, and
replaced him with Lavrenty Beria as head of the GULAG. Beria followed Stalin’s new policy –
“To restore Socialist legality” – by purging the NKVD and reviewing the verdicts passed in the
previous two years. As a result, they released about 223,622 the prisoners, out of about
1,340,000, most of which were criminals, rather than political prisoners.66
Beria wanted to address the problem of low productivity in the camps and assessed that it
was due to the prisoners’ poor living conditions and the lack of proper supplies. In his concern
for the camp’s economic progress, he established both policies that both helped and hurt the
prisoners. He managed to increase the budget for the prisoners’ food and clothing, but he also
completely ended the system of early release and established harsher punishments for the
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“wreckers” and those who refused to work.67 By 1939, the GULAG was barely beginning to
recover from the pressure of the Great Terror when the German threat became a reality and the
Soviet Union began preparing for war.
At this point, the GULAG was “one of the largest economic entities in the country,” and
the government entrusted it with construction projects of military and strategic importance.68
These included massive railroad construction, coal mining, and hydrotechnical projects. The
GULAG administrators constantly struggled to provide enough manpower to fulfill the everincreasing demands made by the Politburo. They responded with brutal exploitation of the
prisoners.69 Although Beria increased the budget for prisoners’ supplies, their living conditions
remained very poor. In the first place, by the time the money or goods passed through the hands
of all the intermediaries a much smaller percentage actually reached the prisoners.70 In the
second place, they had to start every new project ordered by the Politburo from scratch - the
prisoners, after enduring a long and difficult transit, had to build the barracks themselves after
working a full eleven or twelve hour day. Many of the established camps would get rid of their
sick and disabled by sending them to these new work sites, which were absolutely lethal. Even
healthy workers “often died or became invalids because of the brutal treatment” in these newlyestablished camps.71
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War and the Aftermath (1941-1956)
On June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union entered World War II when Germany attacked its
borders. Wartime policies affected everyone in the Soviet Union, including those in the GULAG.
Although the labor camps were of economic importance, the government also perceived them as
a liability. They feared that the politically unstable inmates – the political prisoners, and
especially anyone with German origin – might rise up and side with the Germans, if the
opportunity presented itself. This was, by most accounts, a miscalculation. The memoirists
recalled that most of the inmates experienced a fervor of patriotism and affection for their
country, despite the cruelties they experienced at its hands.72 The GULAG administration put
those with German origin in tighter security, and indefinitely postponed the release of any
political prisoners who had served out their sentences. They also cut the camps off from all
contact with the outside world, including access to radios, letters, packages, and visitors.73
The chronic food shortages that affected all of the Soviet Union during the war struck the
GULAG very severely. The mortality levels of 1942 and 1943 were the highest in the GULAG’s
history. Malnutrition, however, was not the only reason for these death rates. When German
troops advanced into Russian territory, the NKVD had to evacuate prisons and camps in order to
keep “dangerous political prisoners” out of the German hands. They usually did not have
sufficient means of transportation, and made the prisoners march long distances. The guards
killed those who were too weak to continue walking.74
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Post-war: A New Social Order in the Camps
When the war ended in 1945, the prisoners had high hopes of a general amnesty,
especially when the authorities released large numbers of women who were pregnant or had
small children to ease the strain on the camps’ resources. Their hopes came to nothing. Much of
the Red Army had seen, for the first time, the high standard of living in the West, which was
even visible in the war-torn countries that they occupied. Stalin feared the possible consequences
of this and was determined to not to lose control over the population. In 1946 he strengthened the
NKVD, and split it into two branches: the Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to run the
GULAG while the MGB, later KGB, controlled counter-intelligence.
The GULAG continued to expand. During and after the war, the regime sent many nonRussian prisoners to the GULAG. These were former elites, military members, or politically
suspicious members of the occupied territories – Poland, the Baltics, Belorussia, and Moldavia –
and later, it included suspicious groups in the countries that became part of the Eastern Bloc –
Hungary, Romania, and Austria. The GULAG also received enemy soldiers, for, although there
was a separate prisoner of war camp system, the NKVD sometimes sent prisoners of war directly
into the GULAG camps.75
After the war ended, the regime sent its own soldiers to the GULAG. Soviet prisoners of
war often went from a German prison camp to Soviet one, because the fact that they had allowed
the enemy to capture them and that they managed to survive the German POW camps was
suspicious.76 In 1948, the authorities began to re-arrest former prisoners, caught up in the Great
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Terror, who had just finished their ten year sentences. In Magadan, former political prisoners
realized that the authorities were re-arresting them in alphabetic order. Many of these re-arrests
eventually ended up in exile colonies. With the influx of former and foreign prisoners, the
GULAG reached its highest ever camp population in 1953, at 1,727,970 prisoners.77
Although the administration did not enact the positive changes the prisoners had
anticipated, life in the GULAG nevertheless began to change. Since the 1930s, the common
criminals, with the tacit support of the administration, had dominated the political prisoners.
Now there were new types of political prisoners - no longer the intellectuals and peasants
arrested in the 1930’s, but “former Red Army soldiers, Polish Home Army officers, Ukrainian
and Baltic partisans.” These men and women were bolder, had more experience in handling their
enemies, and many, facing sentences up to twenty-five years, had nothing to lose.78
The new political prisoners fought back against the criminals. They were not always
successful, but enough so that they disrupted the status quo. The administration feared that these
political prisoners would redirect their energy and begin to fight against the administration, and
so in 1948 they created new, high-security camps for the most dangerous political prisoners.
These katorga lagpunkts resembled more traditional concentration camps; the prisoners wore
uniforms with numbers, the windows had bars, the barracks were locked at night, and the
prisoners could engage in only manual labor. The new camps backfired for the administration:
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they had totally separated the most dangerous political prisoners from the criminals, and so they
were free to turn all their attention to fight with the administration.79
In the regular camps, where there were still a few political prisoners left, the
administration also acted to diminish the criminals’ power. Many criminals adhered to the
thieves’ code, which forbade working for the government in any capacity, and that included
working in the camps. In the past, the authorities turned a blind eye to these “refusers,” because
were still helping to subdue the political prisoners. Now this was no longer the case; most of the
politicals were in the high-security camps, and so the criminals who refused to work were
becoming burdens to the camps. The administration responded by using promises and threats to
pressure criminals into collaborating with the camp authorities. Those who abandoned their law
were called suki, or “bitches,” and they banded together, with the administration’s approval, to
harass, intimidate, and frequently kill the criminals who remained loyal to the thieves’ code. The
struggle between the two groups became known as the “bitches’ war;” it spread across all of the
camps in brutal violence. It is difficult to determine who won. In some camps, the suki had the
upper hand, whereas on others, the traditional thieves had control. By the dissolution of the
GULAG, the infighting effectively wiped out the thieves’ brotherhood all together.80
The GULAG administration had tried to tighten security and make the camps more
efficient after the war, but their actions made the problems worse. The criminals engaged in a
bloody war that spun out of their control. The political prisoners, meanwhile, used their
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newfound confidence and teamwork to protest the conditions of their high-security camps. They
led an armed uprising in the winter of 1949-1950, and led hunger strikes and work strikes in
different regions for the next two years.
By 1952, it was clear to the government that the GULAG was not, and never would be,
profitable. That year, the state had to subsidize the GULAG for “2.3 billion rubles, more than
sixteen percent of the state’s entire budgetary allocations.” The biggest problem was that the
costs to maintain the camps were very high, but the prisoners were far less productive than free
workers, so the profits of their labor would never exceed the costs of the camp’s maintenance. In
1950, an official sent by the Beria to examine the camps acknowledged that, at the very least,
“the price of maintaining prisoners…far exceeded the costs of paying ordinary free workers.”
The actions of the political prisoners and the factions of the “bitches’ war” drove up these costs,
because they required more guards and more elaborate security measures. Nevertheless, Stalin
showed no inclination to close the GULAG. On the contrary, in 1952 and 1953, he began to
select new groups to occupy the prison camps: the Georgian communist elite and the Soviet
Jews. Then, on March 5, 1953, Stalin died.81
The Dissolution of the GULAG
Stalin’s death brought radical changes to the GULAG. The new government leaders
knew that the GULAG was inefficient and a drain on state resources. Beria immediately ordered
the release of all prisoners with sentences of less than five years, pregnant women or those with
small children, and everyone under eighteen, which totaled to about one million people. After the
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collective leadership ousted him from power, they ceased to make significant changes to the
GUALG. The remaining prisoners expected amnesty and release; angry, they led a series of
strikes in 1953 and 1954, which the authorities had to put down with police and army troops.82
The strikes were not, in themselves, successful, but, ultimately, they forced the government to
act. In July 1954, the Central Committee eased restrictions, shortened the workday, and closed
the high-security camps. Nikita Khrushchev set up a committee to review every prisoner’s case,
and it slowly began authorizing early releases.83
In 1956, Khrushchev rapidly accelerated the process of release with his “secret speech,”
in which he denounced the cult of Stalin and the mass arrests during the Great Terror. The
speech shocked the Soviet Union, and forced his fellow leaders and party members to confront
the realities of the GULAG. By the next year, the government dissolved the GULAG, and
dismantled some of its largest camps. The penal system now constituted of special, isolated
prisoners for especially dangerous criminals run by the Ministry of Justice, while minor
criminals carried out their sentences in prison colonies in their native regions. The Soviet penal
system never dropped forced labor altogether, or ceased to imprison political prisoners, but it
never again reached the magnitude of the Stalinist GULAG.84
Conclusion
In 1918, the Bolshevik ideology gave birth to the first labor camps that evolved into a
massive political and economic machine which finally ground to a halt in 1956. GULAG
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historians are generally at a consensus about the origins of the forced labor camps under Lenin,
but they are less certain as to Stalin’s true intentions when he oversaw the expansion of Lenin’s
prison camps into the massive and deadly GULAG. Some suggested that he deliberately
imprisoned innocent people for economic reasons, noting that Stalin was dedicated to the Soviet
Union’s rapid industrialization, and he took personal interest in the GULAG and its projects. 85
However, the regime arrested many unsuitable prisoners for efficient labor, such as women,
children, and invalids. Moreover, they executed many “enemies of the state,” which made it
unlikely that they arrested people purely as a means of cheap labor.
If Stalin’s paranoia sent millions of prisoners to be “re-educated” and released back into
society, why were the camps so deadly? Steven Barnes argues that death and re-education in the
camps were not contradictions. The Bolsheviks believed that the “class enemy” – the political
prisoners – “must not be allowed to spread its harmful influence to society at large, and therefore
had to be isolated from society until such time as it was reformed or destroyed.”86 Thus prisoners
had to prove that they were capable of reforming and reentering Soviet society by working hard,
and surviving. This relationship between “violence and transformation,”87 between the easily
reformed “social allies” and the hardened “class enemies” that drove the GULAG, was a crucial
element to understanding the administration’s attitude and policies toward the political prisoners
and the common criminals in the camps, as discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CRIMINALS AND THE ADMINISTRATION
The roots of the antagonism between the criminals and political prisoners lay in the way
that the GULAG administration perceived and treated both parties. This chapter explores the
connection between the administration and the criminals. There are no verifiable memoirs
written by criminals in the GULAG, so the first half of the chapter relies on secondary sources
and some political memoirs to describe the criminals in the GULAG, their customs and
behaviors. It also identifies the theories and policies carried out by the GULAG administration
that enhanced the criminals’ power and privilege in the camps. The second half of the chapter
deliberates if and why the administration deliberately empowered the criminals at the expense of
the political prisoners by analyzing memoirs written by political prisoners, as well as two
valuable testimonies left by GULAG personnel – one camp chief, and one guard. As the first
chapter demonstrated, the camp system changed significantly between 1918 and 1956. This and
the succeeding chapter will glance at the earliest years of the prison camps and then focus on the
time period 1934-1950, directly before the Great Terror to just after the end of World War II,
when the criminals exerted the most control over the camps.
Political Prisoners, Bytoviki, and Blatnye
By the 1930s, the GULAG held two basic categories of prisoners: political prisoners and
regular criminals. The political prisoners included all those whom the judicial organs sentenced
under Article 58 of the 1926 Criminal Code, which prosecuted “counterrevolutionary crimes,”
such as treason, espionage, terror, diversion, wrecking, anti-Soviet speech, and having a
“treasonous” family member. The criminals, on the other hand, included those men and women
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who received sentences for “non-political” crimes. Among the criminals, there were two distinct
subgroups. The first were the bytoviki, who received sentences for minor crimes and who were
not habitual criminals. Many bytoviki were peasants or workers who committed such crimes as
“stealing a single rubber boot” (six year sentence), or “stealing three bottles of wine” (seven year
sentence), and similar offenses.88 The second group were the blatnye, also called urki, who were
professional criminals, convicted for crimes such as theft, prostitution, banditism, murder,
speculation, marauding, military crimes, and “official malfeasance and economic crimes.” The
distinction between the byotviki and the blatnye was “sociological rather than legal,” so there are
no official statistics about the ratio of bytoviki to blatnye in the GULAG.89
The majority of the prisoners in the GULAG were common criminals, that is, bytoviki
and blatnye. Before the Great Terror, political prisoners made up a mere twelve to eighteen
percent of the GULAG population. By 1939, they rose to thirty-five percent, and this percentage
remained more or less steady until the Soviet Union entered the Second World War. At that
point, the Soviet authorities released many non-political prisoners early and sent them to the
battlefield, thus raising the percentage of political prisoners in the camps. It peaked at fifty-nine
percent in 1946, but it dropped consistently in the following years, because after the war had
ended, many habitual criminals re-entered the system.90 There was also an influx of soldiers; the
judicial organs sentenced some, like Solzhenitsyn, under Article 58, but sentenced others, like
the memoirist Janusz Bardach, under a “criminal” article of the code.91
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The Society of the Vory-v-zakone and The Criminal Code
Many of the professional criminals belonged to a wide-spread, powerful society that
operated in and outside of the GULAG. It included thieves, swindlers, counterfeiters, and some
prostitutes, but it excluded violent “gangsters.” The elite, or inner circle, of the professional
criminals' society were the vory-v-zakone, translated as “thieves-in-law.”92 This society had its
roots in thieves’ arteli, or guilds, which formed in the mid-nineteenth century. These guilds
consisted of thieves in the same line of business, who united and elected a leader from amongst
themselves.
The Soviet penal system helped turn these guilds into a national, unified organization,
because the camps and prisons brought the professional criminals into much more frequent
contact with each other. This helped the thieves develop a single identity and a set code of
values. The administration’s tendency to transfer inmates between prisons and camps frequently,
“allowed not only repeated interaction, but also the spread of information…[which] was
necessary in order to inform the prison population about new entries into the vory brotherhood,
check reputations, expose frauds, and monitor convicts’ transfers.”93 The scale of the camp
system helped the newly-unified vory society spread across the country, its members spreading
from camp to camp and onward into the surrounding cities and countryside.
The vory had a strict code of behavior. They were supposed to support each other, help
each other, and share all they had with each other. The Code forbade them to use violence
against one another without express permission from the skhodka, the vory court. It also forbade
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them to work for the government in any way; that included working in a factory or state-owned
industry, fighting in the army, and most importantly, working at a corrective labor camp.94 In the
early seventeenth century, the criminal underworld in Russia began to develop its own traditions
and morals, which became the basis for this code of conduct. Serguei Cheloukhine suggests that
the professional criminals turned these traditions and morals into a well-developed ideology in
the late eighteenth century, when the Tsarist government imprisoned more and more political
dissidents. The interaction between the ideological dissidents and the criminals may have
“enriched the underworld with new moralistic values.”95
The vory-v-zakone was an elite society that heavily influenced the regular blatnye. Most
blatnye aspired to become vory one day, so they faithfully followed the same code of behavior.
For this reason, it was difficult for outsiders to distinguish the vory from the ordinary blatnye –
many sources, including memoirs by political prisoners, used these terms interchangeably.96
Author Mikhail Dyomin, who spent some time as a train thief, compared the society of the
blatnye to the Communist Party, because both had “the same kind of solidarity and
unquestioning submission to regulations.”97 To continue with this analogy, the vory-v-zakone
were like the Central Committee; the party’s elite, whose positions granted them both power and
prestige.
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While the distinguishing between blatnye and vory may have been difficult, it was easy
for the population to identify professional criminals in general. Both the men and women had
tattoos, with a wide variety of designs, such as angels praying around a crucifix,98 portraits of
Stalin, a tribute to the blatnye’s mother, or erotic images.99 These tattoos were functional as well
as decorative: to those who understood the symbolism, the tattoos held clues about the wearer’s
status, sexual orientation, previous crimes and prison terms. The criminals severely punished
those among their ranks who had tattoos that were inappropriate to their status in the
fraternity.100 The men wore distinct personal fashions, such as keeping the nail of the little finger
very long, putting bronze crowns on healthy teeth, and wearing aluminum crosses around their
necks.101 The blatnye also used their own slang, to the extent that outsiders saw it as a different
language, “its grammatical structure being Russian, but with a different vocabulary.”102 Scholars
estimate that this language developed as a combination of sailor’s slang, Yiddish, and
Romany.103 The camp administration and non-blatnye referred to it as the “thieves’ speech,” but
use of this slang became widespread in the GULAG, by both the political prisoners and the camp
guards.104
The tattoos and the slang were the two main blatnye identifiers, but they also developed
other signs and rituals for this purpose. Alexander Dolgun recalled such a ritual in An American
in the Gulag. He befriended some members of the blatnye in his first cell, who advised him that,
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if the guards transfer him to a different cell, he should find and step on a white handkerchief
lying next to the latrine barrel. Shortly afterwards, the transfer took place. The guards took the
new prisoners and sent them, one by one, into their new cells. Dolgun, waiting in line to enter his
cell, observed that near the urine barrel “there was a gleaming white handkerchief spread out,
exactly in the path of anyone walking into the cell.” The political prisoners entering before him
naturally side-stepped it, but Dolgun “carefully wiped [his] feet on the handkerchief” as he
entered. Immediately, three or four of the blatnye in the cell ran up to him saying, “Welcome,
brother, sit down, we’ll get you some tea and then you can tell us your story.”105
Reeducation and the Criminals
Lenin believed that crime was a consequence of capitalism, and it would eventually die
out in his communist society. Until then, prison was a place of reeducation, and a means of
reforming the capitalists and the victims of capitalism until they were fit to re-enter Soviet
society. Lenin signaled his dedication to re-education in July 1918, when his government
established special agencies, the Distributive Commissions, to provide their prisoners with
cultural and political education, as well as some technical training.106 In theory, all the prisoners
were capable of reformation. Nevertheless, from the beginning, the regime divided up its
prisoners, not according to the severity of their crimes, but according to the likelihood of their
reformation. They considered regular criminals as the “proletariat” of the GULAG. They were
close to the working class, that is, “socially friendly,” and so they had “the highest potential to
earn their way back to Soviet society.” The political prisoners, “counterrevolutionaries,” and
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“former people” represented the “bourgeoisie” of the camps; they were naturally hostile to the
workers’ regime, and so they had the least potential to return to Soviet society.107
From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, the GULAG’s rhetoric of re-education was at its
strongest.108 The Cultural-Education Department replaced the earlier Distributive Commissions,
and organized theatrical performances, printed camp newspapers, and gave political lectures in
all the camps.109 The Department, however, directed its activities primarily toward the “socially
friendly,” and the camp chiefs followed suit. In 1931, the GULAG chief Kogan wrote that reeducation in the camp had two goals: “a) to achieve full class stratification of the prisoners and
with the help of the strata socially close to us to carry out the necessary measures, and b) to
correct and politically educate the socially close element.”110 Similarly, the deputy chief of the
Karlag camps wrote in 1932 that the camps must educate the prisoners but, “in the first order, the
layer socially close to the working class.”111
The criminals also received special privileges which corresponded to their status as
“socially friendly.” An order issued at Belemor declared: “All criminals coming under article 35
of the Code, all social miscreants and women, were to receive the best and most humane
treatment.” 112 Criminals generally received lighter sentences and were eligible for early release.
Those who “exhibited exemplary behavior in camp” could take a “wide array of positions within
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the camp, including administrative positions and armed camp guards.”113 Dmitri Likhachev, a
political prisoner in Solovetsky in the late 1920s described this distinction between prisoners:
“In those distant days the population of the camp was divided into the “socially near”
and the “ka-ery” (the counterrevolutionaries – prisoners caught under Article 58; the
word kontrik didn’t yet exist). The ‘socially near’ were given every advantage. They
could live outside the monastery walls, take the best duties, and were even recruited into
the secret police.”114
Their special position in camp and the re-education rhetoric reinforced the idea that the criminal
classes were redeemable, and superior to the political prisoners. A former thief, recalling his time
in the GULAG, reflected this sentiment, saying:
I was even proud that although a thief I was not a traitor and betrayer. On every
convenient occasion they tried to teach us thieves that we were not lost to our
Motherland, that even if we were profligate sons, we were nevertheless sons. But there
was no place for ‘Fascists’115 on this earth.116
The Division between the Politicals and the Criminals Deepens
As the labor camps grew and developed from 1926 to 1934, the rhetoric of reeducation
focused on the criminal classes, but it did not completely reject the political prisoners. A GPU
officer, speaking at Belemor, gave a speech to the criminals in which he mentioned that the
political prisoners were secondary targets for reeducation, saying: “The road for your return to
your factory or kolhoz117 before your terms expire is not closed, provided you show us here that
you work loyally and honestly and will help us take care of and re-educate the counter-
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revolutionaries.”118 At the White Sea Canal camps, most of the propaganda concerned the
reformation of the criminal classes, but there was still some that addressed the possibility of
“reforging” a political. Gorky’s The Canal Named For Stalin focused on criminals, but it
featured a few “political converts,” including a “former wrecker” and “a working class exsaboteur,” both of whom found the error of their former ways through honest labor.119
Similarly, in these early years of the GULAG, the administration did not completely deny
the political prisoners the privileges granted to criminals. Dmitri Likhachev, a prisoner at
Solovetsky in the early 1930s acknowledged that while there were criminals in good positions in
Solovetsky, there were privileged political prisoners too:
The authorities realized that thieves and bandits couldn’t really be trusted: they were the
very ones who would steal, murder, deceive and disrupt discipline. So there was still a
small group who enjoyed a higher standard of living than the rest.…To this group of
prisoners belonged those who were there under ‘official clauses” (for example, secret
agents whose cover was blown and who’d been charged with ‘divulging State secrets’),
foreign currency speculators, embezzlers, etc.120
Likhachev himself experienced some privileges that would be unthinkable, ten years later, for
someone in his position. Arrested and sentenced under Article 58 for possession of anti-Soviet
writing, Likhachev spent a few years in manual labor at Solovetsky, but, remarkably, he received
permission to leave for the mainland in 1931 and work as a book keeper at one of the camps
connected to the White Sea Canal.121
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After 1934, the GULAG administration began to institute system-wide changes that
created a more oppressive regime for its political prisoners. They scaled back the few
“educational” activities for the political prisoners and tightened camp security. In April 1935, the
People’s Commissar of the Interior sent Order no. 00159 to the GULAG camp leaders,
reminding them that:
The NKVD corrective labor camps hold a large number of extremely dangerous
counterrevolutionaries: spies, terrorists, and other anti-Soviet and anti-Party elements,
who are bitter enemies of the Soviet regime with nothing to lose and who are always
ready for the most intense counterrevolutionary action.122
The order listed actions that the camp leaders must undertake to secure their camps, and it
focused on increasing the surveillance of the political prisoners.123 In 1936, the administration
ordered the removal of all political prisoners from positions in the Culture-Education
Department’s activities, such as working in the camp theater, or running the camp newspaper.124
In 1937, it issued orders to remove political prisoners from “administrative and managerial
positions” (excepting foremen, taskmasters, and supervisors). They called for heightened
security, the cession of unescorted movements by the political prisoners, and more serious
punishments for minor violations of camp order.125
While the GULAG administration systematically stripped the political prisoners of the
last vestiges of freedom, the criminals retained all their former privileges. Solzhenitsyn noted
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that while the administration made many changes to the political prisoner’s life in the camp, it
retained its tradition of empowering and favoring the “socially friendly:”
There was only one of its new acquisitions of the recent past that Gulag did not part with:
the encouragement of the hoodlums, the thieves (blatnye). Even more consistently than
before, the thieves were given all the “commanding heights” in the camp. Even more
consistently than before, the thieves were egged on against the 58’s, permitted to plunder
them without any obstacles, to beat, to choke.126
As the political prisoners lost status in the labor camps, the criminals kept their former
privileges, thus deepening the division between the two. According to Solzhenitsyn, these
administrative decisions that further empowered one group and restricted the other from 1926 to
1934, resulted in the beginning of “that ten-year period of the thieves’ most flagrant debauches,
and the most intense oppression of the politicals.”127
Despite the widespread changes in the camps, the GULAG administration continued to
insist that they were dedicated to prisoner reform. Fyodor Mochulsky, a former GULAG camp
chief, described a conversation he held in the late 1940s with the deputy director of the NKVD,
who presented the official narrative about the camps, saying:
In capitalist counties…prisoners just rot in jail. No matter what their sentences were, they
were never given the possibility to be reeducated, because this kind of training could only
be done through honest labor. The capitalist prisoners simply sit in their cells for several
years, and then they are let out when their time is up, and they go back into society being
the same criminals they were when they were arrested….In the USSR we do not let our
prisoners languish in prisons. We send them to special camps that we have created, so
that they can be reformed through productive labor.128
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The NKVD official neglected to mention one crucial aspect about the camps: the prisoners either
reformed or died. There was no space for failure. As Steven Barnes argued in Death and
Redemption, the prisoners in the GULAG “had to prove their capacity for redemption” through
the quality of their labor. By the late 1930s, the cultural and educational activities were minor
aspects of the re-education process, for “labor was not only the means but also the measure of an
inmate’s reform.”129 Labor reformed the prisoner, and so the “socially friendly” required the
least amount of “productive labor,” while the political prisoners required the most. By
designating the types of work permitted to the political prisoners and to common criminals, the
GULAG administration ensured that the heaviest labor went to the political prisoners, who
needed it the most.
Privileged Positions in the GULAG: The Trusties
The GULAG administration accorded various privileges to criminals. In general, they
received better treatment from the guards. They could make purchases at the camp
commissary,130 and receive visitors, but most importantly, they could avoid general work. In the
1930s, the GULAG administration established a detailed system that assigned prisoners certain
types of jobs according to their social origin and physical health.131 There were three categories
of jobs in the camp: heavy labor, or general work, light labor, and privileged positions. By 1937,
the administration forbade “counterrevolutionaries” to occupy any of the privileged positions,
and those convicted under the more serious terms of Article 58, such as terrorism or “betrayal of
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the Motherland,” could only perform general work.132 The general work was deadly – strenuous
physical activity, very long hours, and poor working conditions. Almost anyone who survived
the GULAG had, for at least some of his sentence, worked in a “privileged position” as a
“trusty.”133
A “trusty” job was any one that was not general labor. Members of the OGPU held the
leadership positions, and free Soviet citizens became guards. The camp chiefs assigned all other
aspects of running the camp to the inmates. The “lowest class” of trusties were the cook’s
helpers, laundresses, etc. – those who had to work hard, but indoors, and who received better
rations. Next there were the “work trusties” – technicians, superintendents, planners, etc. who
had to leave the camp to work. They had better food and living conditions, and a degree of power
over “the work, the feeding, and the life of the sloggers.”134 Finally, there were the “compound
trusties” - the cooks, barbers, medical assistants and so on. They had power over the resources of
the camp; they could take, or give to their friends, extra food and supplies.135 The camp
administration also hired guards from the prisoners, mostly in the 1920s and early 1930s. 136
Although the GULAG administration barred the “counterrevolutionaries” from these
positions of safety and power, many individual camp leaders assigned political prisoners to fill
these positions because they were generally better-educated and more capable than the “socially
friendly.” Varlam Shalamov described this phenomenon, saying:
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The political prisoners…managed to get a position intended for civilians (there were no
civilians) or common criminals (common criminals didn’t prize these ‘privileged jobs’
since they could always find that type of work, and therefore they frequently got drunk
and worse). Staff positions were filled by persons sentenced under Article 58 of the
Criminal Code and they did their work well.137
The GULAG administration frequently sent commissions to ensure that all the prisoners were
working in the correct fields. As soon as the commission arrived, “a wave of the chief’s white
hand would send off the 58’s to general work without hesitation or regrets.”138 Then, after the
commission left, new political prisoners would eventually fill these “trusty” jobs until the next
commission arrived. This was an agonizing process for the political prisoners involved, when
their “temporary well-being painstakingly built up over months was shattered to bits in one fell
day” and when, to their resentment, “only the nonpolitical offenders could enjoy their trusty
situation serenely.”139
Nevertheless, this practice continued throughout all the GULAG camps. Shalamov
argued that it was necessary to put these educated politicals in trusty positions for the camps to
operate successfully, saying:
The worst camp heads, those who had the least experience, would conscientiously carry
out the orders of their superiors, and not permit persons condemned under Article 58 to
work with any instrument other than the pick and wheelbarrow, the saw and the axe.
Such camp heads were the least successful. Such camp heads were quickly fired.140
Having a “trusty” job was the prisoner’s key to surviving the GULAG. Although the political
prisoners had unofficial access to the “trusty” jobs, getting one was hard, and losing it eventually
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was certain. The GULAG administration primarily empowered the criminal classes by giving
them guaranteed access to these life-saving positions.
Theft and Violence among Prisoners
In addition to their access to the “trusty” jobs, the blatnye also benefitted from the
administration’s very lenient attitude toward their activities; in other words, they could rob,
harass, and assault the political prisoners with impunity. The professional criminals began this
demoralizing process the moment they came into contact with political prisoners after arrest during transportation from the prison cells to the labor camps. Solzhenitsyn described this
experience, saying:
When you were jammed into a Stolypin compartment141, you expected that here, too, you
would encounter only colleagues in misfortune. All your enemies and oppressors
remained on the other side of the bars, and you certainly did not expect them on this
side….An emissary of the ugly snout descends…and this little demon unties your bag
and rifles your pockets – not tentatively, but treating them like his very own. From that
moment, nothing that belongs to you is yours any longer.142
Much of the violence committed by the blatnye occurred during the robbery process, or
during card games. Card games were the blatnye’s favorite form of entertainment, and once they
ran out of their own possessions to wager, they would wager someone else’s. Shalamov wrote
about such an incident: the thief Naumov was losing heavily in a card game, and he turned to the
political prisoners in the barracks to find something to wager. He demanded that Shalamov’s
companion, Garkunov, hand over his wool sweater, which was “the last package from his wife
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before he was sent off to Siberia.” Garkunov refused, and the two men began fighting. Naumov
stabbed and killed him, and then “tore off his undershirt and pulled the sweater off his
head…The game was over.”143
To the political prisoners, this theft and violence was constant, senseless, and cruel.
Worse still, the GULAG administration tolerated it, and the guards rarely interfered. Gustav
Herling recalled an incident in his camp, where a group of blatnye overpowered and raped a
young woman at night in the middle of the camp, and once she managed to scream for help, “a
sleepy voice called from the nearest watch-tower: ‘Come, come, boys, what are you doing? Have
you no shame?’” That was all. The gang simply moved her to a more discreet position, and
continued their assault.144
The “Honest Thieves” and the “Bitches”
The thieves’ law absolutely forbade its members to work for the government in any way.
This includes performing hard labor in the camp, but also taking a job as a trusty. The blatnye
community ostracized, and, if possible, punished those among their ranks who became trusties,
naming them suki, or “bitches.” Those who remained true to the criminal code called themselves
the “honest thieves.” Although these trusty jobs were theirs for the taking, as socially friendly
elements, and would provide them with certain comfort in the camp, the thieves-in-law insisted
on holding to their principles, for, as former thief Mikhail Dyomin put it:
The convicts that (worked in the camp) were called “dummies,” and with good cause.
Once a person decided to latch himself on to a warm spot, he involuntarily started playing
143
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up to the authorities in every way possible. From there it was just a short step to betraying
one’s own kind (openly or on the sly) and cooperating actively with the Cheka.145
There were a few exceptions to the rule. The Criminal Code permitted the blatnye to be
brigadiers – men or women who oversaw their assigned work brigade. Technically, this was not
a trusty position, but it carried certain privileges.146 Dyomin adds that, in the 1940s, the thievesin-law amended the Code by saying that, “in cases of extreme need” the thieves could become
“team leaders and barbers.”147
The brigadier supervised other men’s work, but did not have to work himself, so this was
an acceptable position for the “honest thieves.” The other “honest thieves” simply refused to
work. Solzhenitsyn recalled that, at his first camp, the chief appointed him as a brigadier because
of his military background. He was in charge of “a group of thieves who just a bit earlier had
almost cut the throat of the camp chief.”148 When guards brought them to work at the clay pit,
they simply “lay down in the clay pit in a sheltered spot…and lay sunning themselves.” When
Solzhenitsyn’s replacement came and tried to order them about, “they chased him, and in a low
spot in the clay pit knocked him down and smashed his kidneys with a crowbar.”149 Thieves in a
mixed brigade would adhere to the code by stealing some of the other prisoners’ work output –
timber, earth, or coal, counted in cubic yards – and pretend it was their own in order to receive
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full rations, for the GULAG administration created a system in which they fed the prisoners
according to how much “cubage” they produced during the day.150
Theories on the Source of the Criminals’ Power
The blatnye wreaked havoc on the political prisoner’s lives in the GULAG. They got
away with this behavior because the GULAG authorities, from the upper administration to the
regular guards, permitted it. The political prisoners offer a few theories as to how and why this
happened. Solzhenitsyn believed that, from the start, the Soviet leaders intended to use the theory
of the “socially friendly” and the “socially dangerous” to empower the common criminals and
persecute the political prisoners. They put the idea of the “socially friendly” into policy in the
early years of the prison camps, and over a short time the boundaries between the political
prisoners and criminal evolved, until the criminals became an extension of the guards, or in his
words, “the rear ends of the bluecaps.”151 Solzhenitsyn emphasized that this system began as
deliberate discrimination, but quickly evolved into a means of using the criminals as an extra
level of control over the political prisoners:
It was by no means the least significant of our literary figures152 who determined that the
thieves were our allies in the building of communism. This was set forth in textbooks on
Soviet corrective labor policy…in dissertations and scientific essays on camp
management, and in the most practical way of all – in the regulations on which the highranking camp officials were trained…When this elegant theory came down to earth in the
camps, here is what emerged from it: The most inveterate and hardened thieves were
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given unbridled power of the islands of the Archipelago153… The thieves became just
like an internal camp police, camp storm troopers.”154
He added that, “in the places where the thieves were not given such power, they were all, on the
basis of the same class theory, very much favored.”155
Solzhenitsyn also argued that the GULAG administration empowered the blatnye and
turned them into an “internal camp police” as a logical extension of the “socially friendly”
dogma, but also out of self-interest:
It was quieter and easier for the chiefs that way: not to tire their arms (with beatings) or
their throats, not to get involved in details, and even not to appear in the camp compound.
And it was much better for the business of oppression; the thieves carried it out much
more brazenly, much more brutally, and without the least fear of responsibility before the
law. 156
The guards also acted out of self-interest. When the convoy guards received newly-sentenced
prisoners, still in possession of a few elements of their previous life, they would “systematically
mix thieves and politicals in each compartment…not through lack of space for them elsewhere
and not through haste, but out of greed.” The thieves would then “strip the beavers157 of
everything, and then these possessions migrated into the suitcases of the convoy.”158 Alexander
Dolgun witnessed the same phenomenon. On transit, the guards put him and a few other political
prisoners in an urki- filled cell, where the urki
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…simply knocked the poor fellows down, and while one or two held the victim, others
stripped off his clothes and searched his person…Shortly the cell door was unlocked, and
a senior officer came in with two or three guards. He shouted, “This is terrible! There has
been a terrible mistake!...Get these political prisoners out of here, you fools!”…The
guards smirked at this. One political, bolder than the others, said, “What about getting our
stuff back, then?” But the officer just kept on…as if he had not heard…As the door was
closing on them, the officer stuck his head back into the cell and winked at the urki.159
The camp guards also benefitted from this collaboration with the thieves. One thief related to
Alexander Dolgun that “We can get the guards to sell the stuff we liberate from new arrivals, and
we split with them, and they buy us food and tobacco in town and make sure we have what we
need.”160
Other memoirists agreed with Solzhenitsyn, but believed that GULAG administration
used criminals to control the political prisoners, not out of convenience, but out of perceived
necessity. Janusz Bardach suggested this in his memoir, saying:
In 1935, criminals accounted for more than 50 percent of the prisoners in the Kolyma
labor camps. However, the mass arrests of 1937-1939 radically changed the composition
of the camp; political prisoners now made up more than 90 percent of the camp
population. In the early 1930s, a shortage of guards forced the camp commanders to use
criminals in that capacity, and the precedent remained in place. Criminals now ruled over
the political prisoners; they could be counted on to intimidate, harass, and brutalize as
severely as the NKVD did.161
Bardach’s figures here were incorrect. In 1935, about sixteen percent of the prisoners were
political, so eighty-four percent were criminals (this number includes both professional criminals
and the non-professional, or “every-day life” criminals). By 1939, only about thirty-five percent
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of the prisoners were politicals, nowhere near the 90% that Bardach quoted. However, the
population of the GULAG itself rose rapidly during this period. From 1935 to 1939, the political
prisoners went from 118,256 to 454,432.162 At the same time, the official rhetoric about the evils
and dangers of the “enemies of the people” intensified. In the years after 1935, the political
prisoners became more dangerous and more numerous in the administration’s eyes. To them, it
may have felt that politicals were ninety percent of the prison population. The year 1935,
according to Solzhenitsyn, also began the decade of the “thieves’ most flagrant debauches and
most intense oppression of the politicals.”163 It is likely that this occurred because the
administration, fearing the rapid influx of political prisoners, permitted or encouraged more
extreme behavior from the criminals.
The GULAG administration may have empowered the criminals in order to subdue the
political prisoners who were more “dangerous” to the State, but Varlam Shalamov suggested that
the guards and the administration simply put up with the criminals because they were afraid of
them. “The working man is afraid to complain” about the thieves, he says, “for he sees that the
criminals are stronger than the camp authorities.”164 He continued that “the young peasant who
has become a prisoner sees that in this hell only the criminals live comparatively well, that they
are important, that the all-powerful camp administrators fear them.”165 Gustav Herling’s account
of his life in camp echoed this view:
No guard would have dared to show himself inside the barracks after dark, even when the
horrible moans and cries of political prisoners who were being slowly murdered were
162
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heard all over camp; he could never be certain that a billhook would not appear from
behind one of the barrack corners and split his head open.166
The blatnye’s greatest weapon and most powerful strength was its unity. They would
refuse to work together, as a group, and no foreman or camp leader could move them. They
would team up to rob and assault the political prisoners. If a political prisoner retaliated, they had
each other’s backs. For example, when Janusz Bardach accused an urki of trying to steal his
wallet, the urki retaliated by accusing Bardach of the same thing. Then, Bardach recalled, “his
buddies jumped me and took the wallet, but no one came to my aid…For the next few days they
stole my bread, beat me, spat on me.”167 In his memoir, Alexander Dolgun identified this
coherence as the reason for the criminal’s power in camp:
The urki come to prison ready-equipped, if I can use those words, for survival. They have
a code of law that binds them together. They understand each other’s way of
thinking…They are a crude, hateful, antisocial gang…but they hang together and that
makes them strong.168
The Administration’s Perspective
So why did the GULAG administration empower the criminals and allow them to
terrorize the political prisoners? Solzhenitsyn and Dyomin suggested that the GULAG
administration used the theory of the “socially friendly” as a deliberate tool to subdue the
“socially dangerous,” out of necessity, or convenience, or both. Shalamov, Herling, and Dolgun
focused on the fact that the administration feared the criminals, who owed their power in the
camps to the administration’s policies and to their own unity, and who had gotten out of the
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administration’s control. Two memoirs, one by Fyodor Mucholsky,169 a camp chief in the 1940s,
and the other a diary left by Ivan Chistyakov170, a member of the red army who worked as a
camp guard in the late 1930s, provide a new perspective on the relationship between the GULAG
administration and the blatnye.
Mucholsky’s memoir supports the theory that the GULAG administration empowered the
criminal classes, using the “socially friendly” rhetoric, because it believed that it was either
necessary or convenient to use the criminals to control the political prisoners. Chistyakov’s diary
and official documents also attest that, in theory, the administration wanted to curb violence
toward prisoners and between prisoners. Both testimonies indicate that the prisoners’ treatment
in the camps was in the hands of the individual camp chiefs and guards, who received little
supervision or support from the upper administration. In these circumstances, it was easy for the
guards to protect and support the thieves, in return for a share in the stolen goods. It was easy for
the guards to look the other way when violence broke out, and avoid getting hurt themselves. It
was even easy for the thieves to become so dangerous in the camps that the administration feared
to tangle with them. And finally it was easy for the camp chiefs to keep the ever-more
treacherous political prisoners in line by handing that responsibility over to the criminals.
Both memoirs confirmed that the upper levels of the GULAG administration put heavy
emphasis on the re-educative nature of the camps. When Mucholsky first joined the GULAG
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NKVD, he received a lecture from the deputy director of cadres about the “great and honorable
mission” of the GULAG, who explained that:
The Soviet government sets itself the goal of giving each convicted person the
opportunity to atone for his guilt to society by letting him do some honest labor for the
common good….We send them to special camps we have created, so that they can be
reformed through productive labor.171
The deputy does not mention the idea of the “socially friendly “and the “socially dangerous.”
However, he warned Mucholsky not to be too friendly with the prisoners, for “above all, these
are criminals, and some of them are very smart. They will all insist that they are not guilty. Many
will ask you to help them qualify for early release.” Then, he continued his lecture by cautioning
Mucholksy to remember that these prisoners “are still Soviet people. And when they have done
their time, they get back all their rights as Soviet citizens. Therefore, you can count on their
patriotism and their high level of awareness.”172 This is some conflicting advice: you are here to
re-educate the prisoners, do not trust the prisoners, but also you can count on the prisoners. It is
possible that he was alluding to two types of prisoners; the “very smart” ones who insist they are
not guilty (politicals) and the patriotic “Soviet people” (criminals).
Mucholsky first mentioned the distinction between political prisoners and criminals when
he recalled that “a camp-wide directive went to all the bosses, asking them to select some
nonpolitical prisoners (that is, criminals)173 who were strong and healthy” to be sent to a new
unit for a special camp project. He reasoned that,
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The Camp Administration could not risk using a large number of “political prisoners”
from the camps for this work. The politicals were not trustworthy, nor were they very
healthy, as a rule. And they did not have the experience of surviving the severe
conditions of the north that many of the nonpoliticals had.174
In this incident, the Camp Administration demonstrated that they trusted the criminal prisoners
more, and that the criminals lived better than the political prisoners. When his superiors sent
Mucholsky to a strict-regime camp, which held mostly political prisoners, he stated that “they
warned me to be very careful with them, since many of them were very smart people, including
professors, scientists, and other well-known figures in science and culture. All of them were
embittered toward soviet power, and at any moment they could initiate a provocation.”175
Mucholsky, as a camp boss, seemed to have an ambivalent attitude toward both kinds of
prisoners. The “hardened criminals” tested and exasperated him by their refusal to work. In the
end, he managed to cut a deal with the blatnye leader, who, in return, persuaded his men to create
a work party and fill the required work norms.176 The political prisoners also distressed him
because they took advantage of the Basmachi prisoners who increased the average output of each
work brigade. Mucholsky divided these groups into their own brigades, forcing the political
prisoners to work harder. He explained that,
The intelligentsia was especially skillful at using these people for its own interests….But
once they understood that they could no longer exploit the strong but semiliterate
inhabitants of the unit, they saw that in order to survive, they had to adjust to the new
reality…I did what I could to make it possible for them to produce no less than 100
percent of the norm.177
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At the end of his memoir, though, Mochulsky wrote that he was distressed by the different way
that the administration treated political prisoners and criminals in the camps, asking:
Why did the Camp Administration give out-and-out criminals (such as thieves, killers,
big-time bribe-takers, and rapists) all kinds of privileges in comparison to the politicals in
the camp?...They were given opportunities to work for the Camp Administration, to get
easy jobs, and to receive reduced sentences. Why, when these people were actually the
more dangerous elements for society? In the presence of the security platoon on the
outside, these criminals ran the camp on the inside, by terrorizing, and subordinating the
other prisoners to themselves.178
Perhaps significantly, Mucholsky did not describe any violent incidents between political
prisoners and criminals in his memoir, but, in his career as a camp chief, he generally ran new
camps, created in the 1940’s, that held all political prisoners, all criminals, or all prisoners-ofwar. Mucholsky continued to say that, “the Camp Administration knew this was going on, and
instead of putting a stop to it, let it serve its own greedy interests.”179 Thus, he believed that the
GULAG administration deliberately allowed and encouraged the criminals’ activity in the
camps. He did not specify what these “greedy interests” were; he could have been referring to
the extra level of ease and security over the political prisoners that the criminals provided.
To complicate the issue, official documents make it clear that, in theory, criminal
violence and abuse was not acceptable in the camps. A memorandum by A.I. Akulov to Stalin in
1934 described crimes committed by the administration, saying
These cases also demonstrate the administration’s failure to take necessary measures to
nip in the bud the spread of banditry in the camps….A group of prisoners beat up and
robbed prisoners for four months in a row, and no measures were taken against them. As
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a result, prisoners who become victims of robbery are often left completely vulnerable
and defenseless.180
Another memorandum written by a Lieutenant of State Security in 1939 complained about “the
systematic beatings of prisoners by heads of the camp sections, armed guards, and inmates
employed in the low-level camp administration” – that is, the “trusties.” The same memorandum
noted that “gangsters and criminal elements undermine camp discipline and terrorize the rest of
the prisoners. At the same time, the fight against crime and against violators of the camp regimen
is very weak.”181 There was, however, a deep disconnect between what the upper-level
administration wanted, and what the lower-level administrators actually did. This was because
the upper-level orders were often inconvenient or impractical to carry out, and the camp chiefs
could ignore them because they received very little direct supervision from their superiors.
Mucholsky frequently described this lack of supervision or even helpful guidance from
the higher administrators. When he began his career in the GULAG, he was supposed to be a
foreman, but, for lack of employees, the administration made him both foreman and boss in
several different camps, which meant that he made all the decisions.182 Frequently, he made
decisions that benefitted the prisoners, like building barracks in an empty campsite instead of
devoting all the prisoners’ time to building rail line, and feeding the upper administration “tufta”
or fake work output numbers until the barracks were complete.183 He used “tufta” several times
to help make the prisoners’ lives easier, and the administration only caught him once, because
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someone had informed on him.184 When dealing with the criminals, Mucholsky was practically
helpless. His superiors did not offer advice – in fact, he suspected that they sent him to these
difficult criminal-only camps out of spite, because they were jealous about the praise he had
received for his successes in his previous camps.185 Mucholsky ultimately had to collaborate with
the uncooperative criminals, because he ran out of options: in their unity, determination, and
easy use of violence, the criminals had the upper hand in the camp.
The guards also received little support from their authorities. Chistyakov frequently
mentioned the difficulty of such a situation, saying, “All they do is swear at us, punish us: the
commissioner, the political advisor, the company commander, the Head of the Third
Section…Who is there to advise, support, and explain? Nobody….That’s what the Cheka call
leadership.”186 And again, “You don’t know what you’re supposed to do, how you’re supposed
to do it or why. Sometimes, you find you’ve apparently done the right thing, and then the next
time you do exactly the same and you’re told it’s completely wrong.”187
Chistyakov indicated that he felt trapped in his job and persecuted by the Third Section,
the OGPU unit that monitored the guards’ and the prisoners’ behavior. He mentioned the
violence between prisoners, but explained that the guards did not try to stop it because they both
feared that they themselves will get hurt or receive a reprimand from the Third Section. He
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described a fight between women who were “beating the former shock worker188 to death,” and
remarked that the guards would not intervene, explaining:
We are not allowed to use firearms within the phalanx…If we wade in there will be a
riot…You just get these riots. The devil knows but the Third Section doesn’t. They’ll
come down on us and bang us up whether or not the use of firearms was justified…Well,
what the hell. Let the prisoners get on with beating each other up. Why should we get
blood on our hands?189
At another point, he wrote that a prisoner attempted to attack one of the guards with a knife,
remarking: “You just have to put up with it, you may be fuming but your job is to re-educate
them, after all, and the law doesn’t say you can swear at them. Besides, there is no law protecting
us. Even if they punch you, you are supposed to show understanding.”190
Chistyakov demonstrated that the guards knew that they were supposed to avoid
bloodshed, but the system in which they worked made it easier for them to “let the prisoners get
on with beating each other up” rather than intervene. They felt that the administration did not
adequately protect them from the prisoners and prioritized the prisoners’ welfare over the
soldiers. Chistyakov noted sarcastically that, “living conditions, educational recreation, diet and
other matters have come under discussion. Don’t worry, no need to be incredulous, they’re not
worried about us, they’re worried about the zeks.”191 Moreover, he demonstrated that the
harshness of the job, the uncomfortable working conditions, and the all-around brutality sucked
the guards in to the system, deadening them to the plight of the prisoners. “I have to admit,”
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Chistyakov confessed, “I am growing into BAM. Imperceptibly the environment, the way of
doing things, the life are sucking me in.”192
Conclusion
Lenin laid the foundation for the empowerment of the criminals when he both insisted
that the purpose of the camps was re-education, and claimed that the criminal elements were
“socially friendly” as opposed to the political prisoners, who were “socially hostile.” For a while,
the regime deemed these prisoners so different that they occupied separate camps. After the
introduction of the first criminals to the NKVD labor camps in 1926 to the official creation of the
GULAG in 1934, the administration fostered the development of a strong, unified blatnye
society, and empowered it to dominate and distress the political prisoners by offering it the
coveted “trusty” jobs and ignoring its violence toward the other prisoners.
It is difficult to determine if the GULAG administration intended this from the start. The
political prisoners suggested two main theories: first, that the administration created policies
beneficial to the “socially friendly” because they wanted to use the criminals to subdue the
political prisoners, out of perceived necessity or simply out of convenience, and second, that the
administration empowered the criminals because of Lenin’s “socially friendly” theory, but they
quickly escaped their control.
Mucholsky and Chistyakov’s testimonies, though valuable, could support either, or both,
theories. Mucholsky clearly states that “these criminals ran the camp on the inside by terrorizing,
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and subordinating the other prisoners to themselves. Camp Administration knew this was going
on, and instead of putting a stop to it, let it serve its own greedy interests.”193 This was the only
time in his memoir that he specifically addressed this idea, and that way he phrased it suggests
that this was not official GULAG policy, but a shameful development that the camp
administration decided to put to its advantage, which supports the theory that this was not an
intentional policy. Mucholsky, however, was only a low-level camp boss, and, as Chistyakov
frequently noted, the lower level administration received little information and support from the
upper-level administration. It is possible that the higher-ups pursued this policy of subduing the
politicals without disclosing it in full to their subordinates. Nevertheless, these memoirs do
verify one fact: by the 1940s, the criminals were slipping out of the administration’s control, and
within a decade, it would take steps to subdue them by pitting them against each other in a
vicious battle for power.

193

Mucholsky, 171.

62

CHAPTER THREE: THE CRIMINALS AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS
The professional criminals made a deep impression on the political prisoners. The men
and women in the camps experienced life with the criminals differently, but both expressed a
range of emotions towards the criminals, from anger and disgust to more positive emotions. The
first section of this chapter explores the views of those political prisoners who held the criminals
in the most contempt, and the reasons behind their sentiments. The second section of the chapter
addresses the female political prisoners’ experiences, which differed from their male
counterparts because, while the men interacted mostly with the male blatnye, the women had to
adjust to life among both male and female blatnye, which brought its own set of challenges. The
final section focuses on a few political prisoners who formed friendships with some members of
the criminal class, what they learned about them, and how this affected their perception of the
criminals in general.
“The Criminals Are Not Human”
Many of the memoirists regarded the blatnye with violent animosity. They frequently
used animal metaphors and racially charged language to describe the criminals, and to
emphasize, directly and indirectly, their depravity and inhumanity. Solzhenitsyn frequently used
such rhetoric. In one example, he vividly described a typical prisoner’s first contact with the
criminals, which often took place during transit. He set the scene in a crowded train car; the
weary political prisoners shuffle on board and find places to sit in the lower bunks when…
Suddenly you lift your eyes…and up there you see three or four – oh, no, not faces! They
aren’t monkey muzzles either, because monkeys’ muzzles are much, much decenter and
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more thoughtful! …You see cruel, loathsome snouts up there, wearing expressions of
greed and mockery. Each one of them looks like a spider gloating over a fly.194
Solzhenitsyn later added: “They are not people. This has become clear to you in one moment.
The only thing to be done with them is to beat them, to beat them without wasting any time or
flapping your tongue.”195 Eugenia Ginzburg’s description of the blatnye resembled
Solzhenitsyn’s; in her first meeting with the female criminals, she recalled that,
When the mongrel horde surged down upon us, with their tattooed, half-naked bodies and
grimacing, apelike faces, my first thought was that we had been abandoned to the mercy
of a crowd of raving lunatics….The fetid air reverberated to their shrieks, their fantastic
obscenities, their caterwauling and peals of laughter.196
Ginzburg wrote that “the professional criminals are beyond the bounds of humanity,”197 and that
“to me they were as alien and incomprehensible as, say, the crocodiles of the Nile.”198 Shalamov
echoed this sentiment, saying simply: “The criminals are not human.”199
The political prisoners had many reasons to dislike the criminals. At the most basic level,
they were angry that the blatnye had easy access to life-saving jobs and goods, and that they
frequently robbed and assaulted their less privileged comrades. For many prisoners, this was
enough to create a lasting resentment. Gustav Herling is an example of such a prisoner. He, too,
used the “subhuman” rhetoric in his memoir, describing one blatnye as “a gorilla with a flat
Mongolian face”200 and later, said that the blatnye were “never…disturbed by the slightest
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symptoms of human feeling.”201 When he discussed the criminals in his memoir, he focused on
their many privileges in the camp and their violence toward the political prisoners. He remarked
that “the urka is an institution in the labor camp, the most important person after the commander
of the guard,” and “the measure of his importance in the labour camp is not only the amount of
years which he has spent wandering from one camp to another, and the seriousness of his
offense, but… frequently even the murder of ‘byelorutchki’, as political prisoners are called.”202
In their memoirs, various political prisoners demonstrated that they had motives other
than fear and resentment for hating the criminals. Solzhenitsyn, and likely many others, suffered
from a sense of betrayal. They expected that the prison guards, interrogators, and camp chiefs
would cause them much grief, for the prisoners “never confused them with human beings, but
have seen them merely as an insolent branch of the service.”203 The recently-arrested political
prisoners, however, expected the fellow prisoners to be on their side. Solzhenitsyn described the
experience:
When you were jammed into a Stolypin compartment,204 you expected that here, too, you
would encounter only colleagues in misfortune. All your enemies and oppressors
remained on the other side of the bars, and you certainly did not expect to find them on
this side …The new prisoner wanted to consider himself a political – in other words, on
the side of the people – while the state was against the people. At that point he was
unexpectedly assaulted from behind and both sides by quick-fingered devils of some
kind, and all the categories go mixed up, and clarity shattered into fragments.205
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The political prisoners, who underwent trials and tortures in their prison cells and then received
lengthy sentences for crimes they did not commit, found the presence of enemies behind the bars
a great and unexpected blow. Many memoirists wrote with great detail about their first
encounters with the blatnye because it was such a traumatic event to find “oppressors on this side
of the bars.”
Some political prisoners focused on the physical and mental injuries inflicted by the
criminals, while others, like Varlam Shalamov, found their moral influence the most disturbing.
The criminals rejected basic morals and energetically followed an alternative code of behavior,
which Solzhenitsyn summed up in three principles:
1. I want to live and enjoy myself; and f—— the rest!
2. Whoever is the strongest is right!
3. If they aren’t [beat]ing you, then don’t lie down and ask for it. (In other words:
As long as they’re beating up someone else, don’t stick up for the ones being
beaten. Wait your own turn.)206
Shalamov argued that “hundreds of thousands of people who have been in the camps are
permanently seduced by the ideology of these criminals and have ceased to be people,”207 for the
political prisoners who survived the camps learned that:
It is possible to commit base acts – and live.
It is possible to lie – and live.
It is possible to give a promise and not fulfill that promise – and live….
In a camp a human being learns sloth, deception, and viciousness.208
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He argued that this ideology captivated the non-criminals in two different ways. The peasants, or
other petty criminals in the camps, gravitated toward this lifestyle because they see that “in this
hell only the criminals live comparatively well.” They reasoned that the criminals have found the
key to camp life and “only by imitating them will [the peasant] tread the path that will save his
life.”209
The intellectual convict, on the other hand, “is crushed by the camp. Everything he values
is ground into the dust.” The intellectual loses his morals and values, and as a result, “he can
persuade himself of anything, attach himself to either side in a quarrel.” Terrified, and broken in
spirit, the intellectual also looks to the criminal world for salvation. He “sees in the criminal
world ‘teachers of life’, fighters for the ‘people’s rights’.”210 Shalamov emphasized that this
transformation is permanent, and the criminal ideology spreads even to the free-workers who
come to the far north – “No one who has worked in the camps ever returns to the mainland. He
would be worthless there, for he has grown accustomed to a ‘rich’, carefree life.”211 Although the
brutality of the camp atmosphere and the demoralization of imprisonment contributed to the
phenomenon, Shalamov was adamant that “the criminal world, the habitual criminals whose
tastes and habits are reflected in the total life-pattern of Kolyma212, are mainly responsible for
this corruption of the human soul.”213

209

Shalamov, 413.
Ibid, 413.
211
Ibid, 414.
212
Kolyma was one of the most deadly and most notorious branches of the GULAG.
213
Shalamov, 414.
210

67

The Women’s Experiences
The female political prisoners had a slightly different experience with the blatnye than
their male counterparts, because the women were vulnerable to violence from all the criminals,
while, with the rare exceptions, the men only experienced exploitation and violence at the hands
of other men. In respect to the male members of the blatnye, sexual violence was the female
prisoners’ greatest concern. The male political prisoners, however, also had reason to fear sexual
violence. In view of the taboo connected to homosexuality, the male memoirists rarely spoke
about it. Most of them also kept silence on the topic of homosexual rape, although there are
enough accounts to confirm that it did happen in the camps.214 Shalamov claimed that “almost all
the professional criminals were homosexuals. When no women were at hand, they seduced and
infected other men – most often by threatening them with a knife, less frequently in exchange for
‘rags’ (clothing) or bread.”215 Janusch Bardach confirmed this when he described, in his memoir,
a scene in the bathhouse in which an older blatnye openly raped a younger male prisoner216 while
the others looked on, some excitedly watching and others unwilling or unable to help. Bardach
reflected here that, “I could be forced to lie on a bench in this or in another bathhouse and be
repeatedly raped not by my oppressors – whom I considered to be the NKVD guards – but by my
fellow prisoners. For the first time I realized how vulnerable I was.” 217
Because of the reluctance to discuss the subject, one cannot say for certain that the
women suffered from sexual violence more than the men, but they discussed the topic more
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openly. Rape was a common incident in the camps, and, according to the memoirs, its
perpetrators were most frequently members of the blatnye, simply because they outnumbered the
regular camp personnel – the bosses and the guards. Camp regulations forbade “intimacy”
between camp personnel and prisoners, and between the prisoners themselves. Memoirists like
Ginzberg and Solzhenitsyn described consensual sexual relationships between political prisoners
which, in some cases, blossomed into life-long romances, but these relationships felt the brunt of
camp regulations - if the camp guards caught two political prisoners “cohabiting” as they called
it, they separated them and sent the offenders to the punishment block.218 On the other hand, the
camp chiefs, guards, and criminals, for whom camp regulations rarely applied, often got away
with sexual relationships and sexual violence. The camps system even developed its own slang
for gang rape – “streetcar”219 and “the Kolyma tram.”220
While rape was a real concern for the female prisoners, so was sexual exploitation, which
was much more common. Women very often received propositions from camp chiefs, guards,
and the trusties, who were usually members of the blatnye, in exchange for a little food, or some
warmer clothes, or a better job in camp.221 Gustav Herling recalled the story of a former opera
singer who arrived in his camp and who “was desired by Vanya, the short urka in charge of her
brigade.” She rejected his advances, and so he assigned her to very heavy work; naturally, she
could not fill the norms, and so, according to the camps’ system of feeding the prisoners in
proportion to the work they accomplished, she received very little food. She fell sick, “but the
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medical orderly was a friend of Vanya’s and would not free her from work.” After two weeks of
this treatment, she chose to prioritize her survival, and agreed to Vanya’s demands.222 This was a
very common type of exploitation, in which the criminals in trusty positions used their power to
drive a women to choose between prostitution and death.
The female political prisoners lived and worked in close proximity to the female
members of the blatnye, which created a different set a challenges. The female blatnye were
usually thieves or prostitutes, and they often entered the criminal life through the influence of
their male family members who were thieves themselves. Shalamov described one such woman
he had met in camp; Nastya Arxarova, “a typist from the Kurgansk Oblast,” whose older brother
was a well-known burglar in the area. Nastya became involved with her brother’s affairs and hid
stolen merchandise for him, for which she spent three months in jail. This sentence “angered and
hardened her, and she became part of the criminal world.”223
The female thieves commanded greater respect from their male counterparts than the
prostitutes, but, in general, women “by no means enjoyed equal rights with the men of the
criminal world.”224 The men did not permit them to participate in the vory-v-zakone’s courts of
law, and they had special rules to follow in the criminal’s code of conduct. Among these was
“the time-honored tradition [which] permits the leader of the gang to select the best prostitute
(among the female blatnye) as his temporary wife.” If the leader dies or is arrested, “she will be
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told who her new owner is to be – the master of her life and her death, her fate, her money, her
actions, her body.”225 If the woman resisted, the blatnye retaliated with speed and violence.
In Nastya Arxarova’s case, her brother’s status among the criminal world protected her
for a while, but when she left their hometown, “the leader of the local mob in the first town she
came to made her his wife.” After he was arrested, “Nastya’s next owner exercised his rights to
her.” She tried to resist, but “she was threatened with a knife, and her resistance ceased,” and the
cycle continued. Nastya often came to the camp hospital, carrying out commissions for the
blatnye, which is likely where Shalamov met her. He wrote that “she cried a lot – either because
it was in her nature or because her own fate, the tragic fate of a twenty-year-old girl, terrified
her.”226
While there may have been many female blatnye in the GULAG who mourned their fate
like Nastya, the political prisoners did not see this side of them. They saw women who seemed
wild and depraved, and who frequently intimidated, harassed, and robbed them. Like their male
counterparts, the female blatnye also had access to the easiest jobs, and received lenient
treatment from the camp authorities, so their actions toward the political prisoners largely went
unpunished. Maria Norciszek recalled that
These women were so terrible, that even the guards yielded to them. Once there was such
an incident that two of them played cards to determine who would gouge out the other’s
eyes and at the end of the game straight away, without any scruples, carried it through.
They stole everything they could; I didn’t take off my boots for six weeks so they
couldn’t steal them.227
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The female memoirists largely focused on the trials of living with individuals who constantly
shocked and disgusted them. They described the female blatnye in terms such as “shamelessly
degenerate,”228 “barely human,”229 “appalling creatures, the dregs of the criminal world:
murderers, sadists, and experts at every kind of sexual perversion.”230 To demonstrate the
difficulty of life with the criminals, Maria Norciszek reported this lurid detail:
It was not possible to go to the toilet alone, only in fives. Those women were infected
with various venereal diseases and during baths smeared us with their infected secretions.
Their exploits were generally beyond description. The camp authorities looked on all of
this indifferently.231
She concluded that “those women…in the most shameless way made our lives disgusting and
hopeless.”232 Ginzberg echoed this sentiment:
Never should I be able to put up living among common criminals….At times I even
started to reproach myself. I needed to try more often to remember just what had reduced
them to such degradation….What was uppermost was a feeling of anguish – not for them,
but for myself – that by some devilish conjuration I was condemned to a form of torture
more fearful than starvation or disease, to the torture of life among subhuman
creatures.233
The memoirists also discussed lesbian relationships among the prisoners; it was not as
restricted a subject as homosexuality, but enough so there are very few mentions of relationships
between female political prisoners.234 Rather, many memoirists focused on voluntary
relationships among the female blatnye, which, to many, was just another sign of their depravity.
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They also described episodes of female sexual violence toward the political prisoners. Maria
Norcizek described how, in all-female prison cells, the female criminals “started to have
shameless orgies only to spoil the young girls.”235 Fyodor Mochulsky, a former camp boss,
mentioned that he had met a young girl in his camp who told him that, after her arrest, the guards
put her in a woman’s cell where, at night, several women held her down and violated her with “a
little bag filled tightly with buckwheat groats in the shape of a male member” while “the other
women nearby were afraid to get involved and did not react to what was going on.”236
Overall, the women who spoke most vehemently about the criminals feared and detested
them for the same reasons as the male political prisoners. They certainly felt betrayed by the
presence of enemies behind bars, they were angry at the frequent theft, and feared violence at the
hands of both the male and female members of the blatnye. While male memoirists focused on
the criminals’ violence and immorality, the female memoirists placed greater emphasis on the
mental and emotional difficulty of living next to and under the control of such companions.
Under the Criminals’ Protection
Not all the prisoners shunned the blatnye. A number of political prisoners attempted to
join their ranks, or found protection from individual members of the blatnye against the other
criminals. The camp slang for non-criminals who fell in with the blatnye was “half-breeds”237 or
“semicolored”.238 This was a survival tactic, but some political prisoners saw this as a sign of
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moral degeneration among their fellow prisoners. Shalamov demonstrated such an attitude when
he told the story of a humiliating meeting between two former cell mates, Andreev and Captain
Schneider. Captain Schneider was a former member of the Comintern, “an expert on Goethe and
an educated Marxist theoretician” with whom Andreev used to have “intense
conversations…during the long prison nights.” When Andreev saw his old friend again in the
labor camps, he was overjoyed, but Schnieder’s dull blue eyes showed no recognition of
Andreev.” Captain Schneider had joined “a throng of sycophants” around the blatnye leader
Senechka, who were “eager to perform any service in exchange for a piece of bread or a bowl of
soup.” Shalamov emphasized how utterly degrading he saw such a role when he described this
exchange between Captain Schneider and the blatnye Senechka:
‘Ah, captain,’ came Senechka’s tenor voice with a languid tone. ‘I can’t fall asleep
without you…’
‘Right away, I’m coming,’ Schneider said hurriedly.
He climbed up on the shelf, folded back the edge of the blanket, sat down, and put his
hand under the blanket to scratch Senechka’s heels.239
Shalmov’s portrait of the transformed Schneider showed his deep disapproval of the political
prisoners who choose to join the blatnye, especially those who took humiliating roles. He
ascribed it to cowardice, declaring: “A blow can transform an intellectual into the obedient
servant of a petty crook.”240
Subservience was not the only way to receive favors or protection from the blatnye. The
criminals widely sought out political prisoners who could sing or tell stories for their
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entertainment. This was a more acceptable role among political prisoners, because it placed the
entertainer and the criminal audience on a more equal footing. Shalamov, however, maintained
that this was self-delusion on the political’s part; he accused the storyteller, who believed that he
was “enlightening” the criminals, that he just “could not bring himself to admit that he would
simply be fed, receive an extra bowl of soup – not for carrying out the slop pail but for a
different, a more noble labor. But was it so noble? After all it was more like scratching a thief’s
dirty heels than enlightenment.”241
Other political prisoners did not see it this way. In their memoirs, both Alexander Dolgun
and Janusz Bardach recalled telling stories to the blatnye, in an open manner which suggests that
they felt no shame at being entertainers.242 Dolgun and Bardach are unique among the political
prisoners because they managed to establish strong, positive relationships with members of the
blatnye while in the GULAG. They earned these individuals’ respect and protection, both from
other blatnye and from the administrators, and as a result, these memoirists viewed the criminals
with a much friendlier, more sympathetic eye.
Alexander Dolgun and Janusz Bardach
Alexander Dolgun was born to American parents working in Moscow, and had worked at
the American Embassy prior to his arrest. In the prison cells, Dolgun had a fortuitous encounter
with a political prisoner who had already been in the camps, who warned him about the blatnye.
When he first encountered the criminals in a transit camp, he was mentally prepared to take
action. When two thieves tried to steal his pants, which were in rather good condition, Dolgun
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responded by summoning all his strength – he had very little after months of torture – and
punched one of them in the face. The two blatnye prepared to respond in kind, but they stopped
at the command of their chief, called Valentin Intelligent, who cried, “Off!...Lay off, now. This
man is a dukharik!” Dolgun explained that “Dukh is the word for ‘soul’ but it means pretty much
the same, in this context, as the English word ‘guts’.” 243
Dolgun referred to Valentine as a pakhan, which was “underworld slang for ‘the chief.’”
Dolgun explained that “in rank and authority, this guy has the status of a robber king…To meet
such a distinguished, high class urka is a very rare event.” After Valentin ascertained that
Dolgun could tell stories, he placed him under his protection. He ordered his men to bring
Dolgun food, and give him a place to sleep so that he could regain his strength. While he
remained in the transit camp, Dolgun stayed with Valentine’s men, telling stories lifted from
plots from American films in return for extra rations, provided to Valentine by one of the
“trusties” in charge of distributing food.
Dolgun demonstrated that he did not like the majority of the blatnye with whom he spent
time in the transit camps. He described them as “shobla yobla, the lowest of the urki, or criminal
class. They were very nasty-looking guys.” Later, he remarked that they were “surly, treacherous
thugs…illiterate and subhuman.”244 When the guards transferred him, he used Valentine’s advice
to befriend the blatnye in his next cell by pretending to be one of them, but his opinion of these
urki remained the same: he wrote, “I wondered how long I could keep up the deception. I
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certainly was in no way a brother to these disgusting hoodlums.”245 Dolgun, however, liked and
admired Valentine Intelligent, who “stood out among them like a diamond.” Valentine was
thirty-eight years old, over six feet tall and broad-shouldered, with “immensely keen hearing and
sharp eyes.” He was a safe-cracker which “put him in the top of his professional class,” and he
ruled the cell “like a feudal duke.” The other blatnye in the cell had “absolute respect” for his
authority; for example, when Dolgun was ready to begin his story telling, Valentine informed his
“deputy” that he wanted silence. The deputy “jumped up on the top bunk and whistled sharply
through two fingers. The chatter in the cell died down quickly. The deputy called out, ‘The
pakhan is speaking.’”246
Dolgun wrote that Valentine “was a civilized and intelligent criminal;” he described him
as “a subtle and fascinating talker, an exact and relevant advisor, and a loyal friend.” Valentine
had confided to Dolgun that parents had both been professors and Party members, who “got
caught up in some plot or other,” and whom the government shot for treason, when he was about
eight or ten years old. After his parents’ arrest, the government agents placed Valentine in an
orphanage, which he quickly escaped. Alone on the streets, he eventually joined the criminal
gangs. Valentine claimed that, counting the orphanage, he had spent almost twenty years in
prison. When Dolgun replied, “But isn’t that a terrible life?” Valentine responded:
I miss my women. And wine. I miss wine a great deal. But you can see that I live very
well in prison. It never lasts very long. And when I get out there is no way that I can have
the women and the wine and the good suits unless I live my life with the urki…Can you
imagine me working in an office?...That’s the real slave labor.247
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Valentine was true to his word when he said that prison “never lasts long” for him. Before the
administration was able to ship him away from mainland transit camp to some remote labor
camp, he successfully engineered an escape with two of his closest blatnye companions.248
Dolgun spent little time with the blatnye after this episode in the transit camps – he found other
non-blatnye friends and protectors during his time in the GULAG.
Compared to Dolgun, Janusz Bardach developed a much stronger relationship with the
blatnye, because he liked and befriended several individuals from the criminal class, and spent
much more time with them in the camps than Dolgun did. Bardach was a Polish Jew, drafted into
the Red Army during the Second World War, and sentenced to ten years in camp for “wartime
treason”. Bardach did not receive a sentence under Article 58, and so, technically, he was not a
political prisoner.249 Nevertheless, he identified with the political prisoners,250 the administration
saw him as “politically unreliable,”251 and the blatnye perceived him as a political prisoner as
well.252
Bardach’s first encounter with the blatnye was unusual because it was fairly amicable. It
occurred on a prison train carrying military prisoners and about twenty thieves. Bardach struck
up a conversation with the thieves because “they were more congenial than the military
prisoners, and [he] began to spend most of the days with them.” He recalled that “they wanted to
hear in great detail about my life in Poland; in turn, they told me about the different labor
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camps.”253 Bardach had a more acrimonious encounter later when he accused a group of thieves
of cheating in a game of blackjack. He took a swing at the leader and refused to surrender his
boots and pants, which he had lost in the game. The blatnye easily overpowered him and took
their winnings, but later in the day, the pakhan of the group, a bank robber named Pockmarked,
pulled him aside and, referring to the card game incident, said: “Those young thugs worked you
over pretty well…You looked like a sissy sitting in your underwear, but you took it like a
man…You’re hard inside – I like that.”254
Pockmarked then pressed him for details about “the life of capitalists” and Bardach
obliged, embellishing his stories and capturing the attention of all the blatnye in the cell. In
return, Bardach was “well rewarded with food” and when they parted ways, Pockmarked assured
him that “if you do get into trouble, use my name. The criminals know who I am, and it might
help you.” Bardach recalled that “I felt confident and secure, feelings I’d thought were gone
forever. Pockmarked’s name was a ticket to security in the urka world, and my talent as a
storyteller was as valuable as any tool or weapon.”255
Shortly afterward, the authorities sent Bardach to a transit camp where he became an
orderly in the hospital. There, he made friends with one of his patients, a young thief named Jora,
who had come to the hospital after a brutal beating by one of his fellow prisoners. Bardach
described Jora, saying:
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He looked to me like a nice Jewish boy from a well-to-do Moscow family. With his
guitar, red jacket, and ruffled shirt, he made the impression that he was on vacation, not
in prison…Underneath his cool, controlled behavior, I could tell Jora was scared.256
Jora explained that he used to run a small suitcase-stealing ring that operated at the railroad
stations in Moscow. Another group of thieves led by a man named Arcady, however, also began
the same operation in his territory. Jora explained, “At first I tried to make peace with Arcady
and his people, but they didn’t want to share anything. They were older and more experienced.
Fights broke out, and we landed in Butyrki prison.”257 The turf war continued in the transit camp;
Arcady’s gang beat up Jora severely, and after he recovered, Jora retaliated by decapitating
Arcady’s right-hand man with an ax. At that point, the authorities scheduled Jora and Bardach to
ship out from their transit camp to Kolyma. As the prisoners were waiting to board, Arcady’s
men struck back and stabbed both Jora and Bardach in the backs.
Jora’s wounds were the more severe of the two, so once Bardach boarded the ship, he
went to get Jora some medical help, assisted by a blatnye leader named Igor, who knew Jora
well. After this, Igor and his men welcomed Bardach into their group as “Jora’s Polish friend.”258
During the long boat ride, Bardach came to know Igor’s men quite well. He found that they were
fascinated by his descriptions of the geography around Kolyma, by the stories he told, and by his
information about life in Poland. He wrote that, “I was surprised by their genuine interest and by
the sudden absence of arrogance, vulgarity, and bravado.” Bardach became particularly close to
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one of Igor’s men, “a tall blond youth with a sweet face and engaging smile,” named Pieta. He
wrote that:
I had spotted Pieta the first day I joined Igor’s group. His affiliation with the underworld
was evident in his tattoos, vocabulary, and behavior. But the civility of his expressions
and gestures, his dreamy eyes and tears, suggested something soft and cultured in him. 259
Pieta was an orphan. He explained that, “I never knew my parents…I grew up with other kids on
the beaches in the Crimea and in Odessa. Some older kids took care of me. They taught me to
steal and beg.”
Shalamov wrote that the criminals had a “cult of the mother:” she “the one woman whose
honor is not only protected from any attacks but who is even put on a high pedestal.” He argued
that their demeaning attitude toward women, and especially women among their ranks, negated
this professed respect for motherhood, claiming that “the mother cult is a peculiar smokescreen
used to conceal the hideous criminal world…No criminal has ever sent so much as a kopeck to
his mother or made any attempt to help her on his own.”260 Pieta, however, had a true attachment
to the idea of motherhood. He confided to Bardach that,
I wish I had a mother somewhere, someplace, to write letters to and maybe see
sometimes. I try to remember her, but my earliest memory is of lying on the beach in the
sun…I don’t really care about girls. I’ve had plenty of them. But I dream about my
mother.261
Bardach felt a special connection to Pieta, writing that, “The fact that he confided in me made
me want to be his friend, something that didn’t happen every day.”
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Bardach never completely fit in with the blatnye, as an outsider, and a foreigner at that.
He wrote:
I felt out of place hanging around with criminals. Their only conversations were about
crimes they had committed in the past, crimes they intended to commit in the future,
women, booze, and food. But I was pleased that they had accepted me and let me stay
with them during the journey. They liked having a foreigner among them. In spite of their
arrogance and self-centeredness, they craved to know more about the outside world.262
Bardach’s relationship with the criminals wasn’t always good – he described one incident in
which a couple of thieves accused him of stealing from them, and “for the next few days they
stole my bread, beat me, spat on me.”263 In general, though, Bardach “came to feel very
comfortable with the urkas,” more so than with the other political prisoners. He explained that “I
never tried to be like them, but I understood them and shared my life and knowledge with
them.”264
Bardach and Dolgun’s unique insight into the lives of the blatnye helps humanize these
professional criminals, to an extent. They could be loyal friends to those whom they liked. They
loved stories and were very inquisitive about the world outside of Russia. Of the few who
revealed aspects about their past, Valentine Intelligent, Peita, and someone that Bardach simply
described as “a pimple-faced boy,”265 were all orphans, and there were likely many more blatnye
with this background. Many children in Soviet Russia had, as Solzhenitsyn put it, “been
orphaned by the Civil War, by its famine, by social disorganization, the execution of their
parents, or the death of the latter at the front.”266 The government tried to collect them and place
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them in orphanages and colonies for juveniles. Applebaum noted that these facilities were
“vastly overcrowded, dirty, understaffed, and often lethal.” Many children, like Valentine, ran
away, and once on the streets, “they fell very quickly in the criminal netherworld.”267 The
criminal life gave them a way to survive and its brotherhood gave them family.
While most political prisoners referred to the criminals as one large, homogenous group,
Bardach and Dolgun’s testimony highlighted that there were many smaller sub-groups within the
criminal fraternity, each with their own leader, or pakhan, and that there was a wide variety of
individuals within these groups. They described the strict hierarchy between the group leader and
the shobla yobla, as Dolgun called them. The pakhan had a great deal of authority over his men,
and it is possible that the different groups were more or less violent toward the other prisoners
depending on the personality of their leader. Bardach described an incident regarding the leader
Igor on the ship to Kolyma that supports this idea. He wrote that there were both men and
women on the ship, in different cells. One night, some blatnye that he had never seen before
came and had an agitated discussion with Igor; they were planning to break through a weak wall
to get to the women, but Igor refused to participate. As Bardach and the other blatnye in Igor’s
cell watched a brutal mass rape unfold, Igor remarked: “Those aren’t men, they’re animals.
Violent brutes. My men here, we’re criminals, but we aren’t killers. I’ve never raped a woman.
Never raised a fist at a woman.”268 Although, to the political prisoners, the criminals seemed
universally violent and depraved, this shows that some rejected the extreme violence and
denounced it in their peers.
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“Fear and Haughtiness”
Despite the diversity of criminals and political prisoners in the camps, Bardach and
Dolgun were the only political prisoners mentioned in the memoirs that established mutually
beneficial relationships with members of the blatnye. The memoirs show that there were some
political prisoners, other than Bardach and Dolgun, who befriended a few individuals from the
criminal class, but, unlike the former, they retained a bad impression of the criminals as a whole.
For example, Jehanne Gheith, interviewing GULAG survivor Giuli Tsivirko, noted that “when
Tsivirko talks about individual criminals, she is sympathetic to them, but when she refers to them
as a group, she is antagonistic.” Tsivirko spoke harshly about the criminals in her interview, but
also recalled that she had given a blatnye girl a piece of soap, because, she explained, “this girl
REALLY needed to wash.” Soap was very difficult to obtain in the GULAG, so this was a very
generous gift.269
Eugenia Ginzburg also reflected this attitude about the criminals. She spoke vehemently
against the criminals in her memoirs, but she also related two positive incidents concerning them.
She wrote that when she was cleaning a guest house in the camp, alongside a group of female
blatnye, one of them, “a kindly woman called Elvirka” gave Ginzburg her own galoshes because
the mop water would have ruined Ginzburg’s thin shoes. Ginzburg described her blatnye
cleaning companions as “peaceable and even friendly,” for they took pity on her and showed her
tricks to finish her work quickly.270 Ginzburg also mentioned that, during a long forced march
between camps in the cold of winter, her escort, a professional criminal, took pity on her and her
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flimsy shoes and acquired a sturdy pair of boots for her, which undoubtedly saved her feet from
frost burn.271 The negative incidents with the criminals, however, far outnumbered the positive
ones in her memoirs. Many of the political prisoners - Solzhenitsyn, Shalamov, and Herling, to
name a few - recorded only negative experiences with the criminals. They were unwilling or
unable to forge a friendship with any of them.
Bardach argued that the political prisoners failed in this respect because “most of the
politicals were afraid of the urkas or looked down on them. The urkas smelled their fear and
despised their haughtiness.”272 Bardach addressed two key elements in the criminal/political
relationship. Perhaps, if more prisoners overcame their fear and stood up to the blatnye, like
Bardach and Dolgun, they would have had greater success in their interactions with the
criminals. This, however, was very difficult for the newly-incarcerated prisoners. Solzhenitsyn
explained that:
To strike out boldly, a person has to feel that his rear is defended, that he has support on
both his flanks, that there is solid earth beneath his feet. All these conditions were absent
for the Article 58’s. Having passed through the meat grinder of political interrogation, the
human being was physically crushed in body….His soul was crushed too…Gun-shy now
and for a good long time to come of any and every kind of collaboration or unification,
the pseudo politicals were not prepared to unite even against the thieves.273
“Haughtiness” was Bardach’s second charge. It is possible that there was a class element
involved in the tension between the politicals and the criminals. Many of the political prisoners,
and especially those who later wrote memoirs, were intellectuals, party members, and
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professionals of some sort; though officially in a “classless” society, they were socially and
financially middle class, while the blatnye, as “common criminals,” represented the lowest class
of Soviet society. The dehumanizing language that the political prisoners used, as well as their
descriptions of the blatnye which heavily emphasized their tattoos, vulgar slang, and frequent use
of profanities, give a sense that these memoirists saw the criminals as beneath them,
intellectually, morally, and socially. Even Alexander Dolgun demonstrated this attitude; he
disliked all the other criminals except Valentine Intelligent, because he was different than the
others – in Dolgun’s own words, “civilized and intelligent.”274 This “haughtiness” may have both
prevented political prisoners from even attempting to befriend the criminals, and further alienate
the criminals from the “haughty” political prisoners.
Conclusion
The political prisoners demonstrated a wide range of attitudes toward the criminals. Some
completely denied their humanity, their attitudes informed by the sentiments of fear, resentment,
moral outrage, and possibly class prejudice. The women in the camps were especially vulnerable
to abuse because they had to contend with both male and female blatnye, and so, aside from a
few isolated incidents, their opinion of the criminals was overwhelmingly negative.
Nevertheless, some political prisoners tried to join the criminals, or at least cultivate a good
relationships with them, as a way of surviving the camps. Alexander Dolgun and Janusz Bardach
in particular stand out in this respect because they developed strong friendships with members of
the blatnye.
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Bardach and Dolgun’s unique position among the blatnye gave them valuable insight into
the lives of this elusive group. They frequently witnessed the criminals’ theft and violence
toward their fellow political prisoners, but among their “protectors” they also saw curiosity about
the outside world, a harsh and difficult past, and, in Pieta’s case, vulnerability and regret. There
are no verifiable memoirs that show a criminal’s point of view in regard to their behavior toward
the political prisoners. It is possible that they received direct pressure from the GULAG
administration to oppress the political prisoners, and it is equally possible that they pursued this
behavior simply for their own benefit. There may even have been pressure on the blatnye to
behave this way from their blatnye superiors – the pakhans or the vory-v-zakone. Both Dolgun
and Bardach’s memoirs demonstrate the intense hierarchy among the blatnye groups: in both
cases, the cell leaders offered these political prisoners their friendship. Their subordinates may
not have had that liberty, for fear of their superiors’ disapproval.
There are many variables that could have influenced the behavior among the political
prisoners and the criminals. It is possible that more politicals could have established friendships
with the criminals, had their fear and “haughtiness” not prevented them. There was, however, no
one formula or circumstance that guaranteed that an individual from the blatnye would offer a
hand of friendship to a political prisoner. For example, Alexander Dolgun fought back when a
few thieves tried to take his pants, and their leader responded with admiration for his “guts,”275
whereas when Shalamov’s friend resisted a thief’s effort to take his shirt, the thief killed him.276
Ultimately, the political prisoners’ relationship with the criminals depended on the individuals
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involved and the circumstances of their interactions, but the brutal nature of the camp system and
the administration’s empowerment of the criminals made it more likely that the relationship
between the two types of prisoners would be acrimonious.
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CONCLUSION
The conflict between the political prisoners and the criminals in the GULAG became a
defining characteristic of the labor camps and prisons during the Stalinist era. The roots of this
phenomenon lay in the early Bolshevik theories about prisoners and incarceration. Lenin’s belief
that the “socially friendly” prisoners would be more responsive to re-education in the labor
camps shaped the way that the GULAG administration perceived and treated both classes of
prisoners. As the penal system developed and expanded from 1918 to 1934, the administration
pursued a series of policies which increasingly favored the criminals and put them in a position
of power over the political prisoners until the 1950s.
The majority of the memoirists expressed fear and hatred for the criminals, and spoke
more vehemently of them than of the guards and camp chiefs whom they also saw on a daily
basis. Their fear and hatred stemmed not only from anger at the frequent theft and violence, but
also from a sense of betrayal by those who should have been their friends and supporters behind
the bars, as well as shock and disgust at a lifestyle they considered immoral and degenerate. The
women, especially, struggled to adjust to life with the criminal women who, they believed,
lacked common decency and morals. Two of the memoirists, however, managed to establish
friendships with individuals from the criminal class, which granted them rare insight into the
lives of members of the blatnye. Their memoirs counteracted the view held by many political
prisoners that the blatnye was a homogenous and violent group; their descriptions of the various
criminals whom they befriended emphasized that the blatnye included a wide variety of
individuals with different backgrounds, different reasons for becoming criminals and joining the
fraternity, and different attitudes towards violence and toward the political prisoners.
89

How and why the violence between the prisoners occurred are interrelated questions. To
answer them, this paper looked at both the administration and the prisoners themselves. The
administration’s effort to collect criminals into its “re-educative” camps fostered the creation of a
strong, unified vory-v-zakone that could effectively bully politicals and administrators alike.
Meanwhile, the political prisoners, many of them intellectuals and moderately successful
professionals, found their unexpected arrests, brutal interrogations, and astonishingly long prison
sentences so demoralizing that they became easy targets for anyone who wanted to take
advantage of them.
The administration’s policies favoring the criminals certainly resulted in their significant
power over the political prisoners, but there is some debate as to whether or not this was a result
that the administration intended. The memoirists presented two main theories. The first is that the
criminals grew in power because of the administration’s early policies, but by the 1930s and
1940s they had gotten out of their control. The second suggests that the administration
deliberately empowered the criminals in order to establish an extra level of control over the more
numerous and dangerous political prisoners, either out of perceived necessity or convenience.
This theory has precedent in the Nazi labor camps. There, the authorities encouraged the nonJewish inmates (usually political prisoners and criminals) to fight one another for the privileged
positions in the camps – a “divide and rule” tactic that pitted the prisoners against one another,
while simultaneously recruiting these “better” prisoners to oppress the more “dangerous”
prisoners in the camps.277 It is possible that the Soviet regime followed the same logic as the
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Nazis and deliberately sowed violence and discord among the prisoners to weaken and oppress
the most dangerous enemies of their regime.
Mucholsky and Chistyakov’s memoirs could support either theory. Neither men reported
that they received any special instructions from their superiors regarding the treatment of
criminals as opposed to political prisoners. Mucholsky addressed this question the most directly
when he noted that the camp administration gave the criminals “all kinds of privileges in
comparison to the politicals,” and that the camp administration knew that the criminals were
terrorizing the camps, but “instead of stopping it, let it serve its own greedy interests.”278 This
suggests that he believed that the administrators allowed and encouraged the criminals’ behavior
as a way to control the other prisoners, but it also shows that he believed that this was a shameful
development in the camps rather than an intentional GULAG policy.
Both memoirs also indicated that the administration struggled to control the criminals
during the height of their power. Chistyakov frequently noted that the guards did not intervene in
any episodes of violence between prisoners because they did not want to get hurt, and
Mucholsky demonstrated that he and the other camp chiefs were practically helpless if the
criminals decided to be uncooperative. Additionally, documents collected by Khlevniuk in The
History of the Gulag demonstrated that the main administration disapproved of the unchecked
violence of the criminals and demanded that the camp chiefs address it.
The conflict between the criminals and the political prisoners is an element in the
GULAG historiography which historians have not fully addressed. I suggest two interrelated
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avenues that would benefit from additional research. The first is the criminals themselves; as this
paper demonstrated, much of the information about criminals in the GULAG came from the
political prisoners who believed that the criminals were worse than the camp guards. Dolgun and
Bardach’s memoirs, however, suggest that the criminals behaved with more complexity toward
the political prisoners than the dominate narrative indicates. The criminals were an integral part
of the GULAG experience and victims of the Soviet regime in their own right, and I believe that
more in-depth research into their backgrounds and their experiences in the camps will add to the
analysis of the conflict between the two groups of prisoners.
The second avenue is the administrations’ intentions regarding the criminals. In Gulag: A
History, Applebaum indicates that she supports theory that the administration deliberately
empowered the criminals, but she does not go into her reasoning in great detail.279 The other
GULAG historians that mention the criminals (Barnes, Khlevniuk, Dobson) avoid passing
judgement about the administration’s intentions entirely. I believe that with access to the former
Soviet archives and the untranslated memoirs, one may establish if the early penal administration
truly intended to elevate the criminals at the expense of the political prisoners, or if this was an
unexpected and undesired development. A definite answer regarding these theories would
significantly add to the debate about the true purpose of the GULAG; for example, if the
administration did empower the criminals deliberately to control the political prisoners, it
suggests that they established the GULAG as a place of destruction, but if the alternative theory
proved to be true, it suggests that they intended the GULAG to be more of a place of re-
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education or reformation. On a broader scale, I believe that a deeper understanding of the
conflict between the political prisoners and the criminals, and the extent of the administration’s
participation, will contribute to our understanding of how people behave in intense and lifethreatening situations, like life in the Soviet GULAG.
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